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Irreconcilable Principles:
Law, Politics, and
the Illinois Supreme Court
JACKSON WILLIAMS*

Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent
possible, be reconciled. Candidates for public office
should be free to express their views on all matters of
interest to the electorate. Judges should decide cases in
accordance with the law rather than with any express or
implied commitments that they may have made to their
campaign supporters or to others. The roots of both
principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage.'
Judge Richard Posner, in the passage quoted above, recognized the
strain created by elected judiciaries such as that of Illinois. The electoral
process and its incidents, enshrined by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, create a system in which candidates divide into parties,
take positions on issues, and appeal to citizens for votes on the basis of
serving voters' interests. The legal process, on the other hand, depends, for
its very legitimacy, on independent, unbiased judges who owe debts to no
ideological or economic interest. Can the principles embodied by each
system be reconciled? If not, which system's values predominate?
Recently, media attention has been drawn to the Illinois Supreme Court
as a result of its handling of a controversial case.2 Critics have charged the
court with being "too political."3 In fact, a state legislator alleged in an
unprecedented petition that one justice's political ambitions had determined

* Director of Civil Justice Programs, Defense Research Institute, Chicago. M.P.A.
1996, Governors State University; J.D. 1988 Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
B.A. 1985 University of Illinois. I would like to express my thanks to my thesis committee
at Governors State University and three anonymous reviewers for the American Bar
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1. Buckley v. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
2. Randall Sambom, Illinois Supreme Court Enters New, Rocky Era, NAT'L L. J., Oct.
10, 1994, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Tim Novak, Secretive Justices in Glare of Spotlight, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1996, at 10-11.
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the outcome of the court's important 1991 redistricting decision.4 A flurry
of media and legislative activity culminated in passage of a law to redraw
judicial districts and an impeachment probe of the chief justice.
For decades, reformers have argued that judges should be insulated
from politics through "merit selection" procedures.5 They have contended
that "[t]he elective system is essentially a system of choice by political party
officials ... and party regulars are not known for their independence and
impartiality."6 This system, they say, "diminishes and destroys that
independence by making candidates and judges subservient to political
leaders."7 But, although reformers have explained how an elective system
provides incentives for judges to be biased, they have not produced
empirical evidence to support their argument.
This paper attempts to evaluate the criticisms, and the question raised
by Judge Posner, by examining the behavior of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in those cases in which the electoral and legal systems come into the
greatest potential conflict. The paper's goal is to illuminate some important
issues in an environment free from the sensationalism of press accounts and
the emotionalism of political attacks, and provoke a sensible debate among
the state's bar, legislators, and public about how the perception of a
"political" court impacts on Illinois' legal system.
Courts of last resort in American states often consider cases which can
be called "political", which is to say, the litigants in the cases are not
individuals with private disputes, but are either (1) political officeholders or
candidates who seek to affect an election outcome or (2) special interest
groups which seek a declaration of the invalidity of legislation. Although
these cases are argued, and the courts' opinions are supported on the basis
of constitutional provisions and case precedents, many observers believe that
in political cases, a judge's vote will be affected by sympathy for the
political party or interest group which supported that judge's ascent to the
bench.
The author is doubtful whether an empirical study of Illinois Supreme
Court decisions can determine whether there is a relationship between a
judge's political party and his votes in politically charged cases, or exactly

4. People ex rel Burris v. Ryan, 634. N.E.2d 1066, 1067 (1994) (Bilandic and
Harrison, JJ., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Barry F. McNeil, Selection of State Judges Should be Nonpartisan Task,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 5, 1996.
6. Charles W. Joiner, The Judiciary, ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, 187-88 (1970).
7. Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, COMMIrEE
PROPOSALS, at 1011 (1970).
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how special interest groups influence the court's makeup and output. This
article is not meant to be an objective social science paper, but one that tries
to use a political science exploration of judicial politics to aid Illinois
residents in evaluating the court. The author concludes that an argument
can be made that there is an appearance of political influence on the court,
and that this appearance may be eroding the legitimacy of the court.
I. SELECTION OF ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
A. METHOD OF SELECTION

The legal basis of the Illinois Supreme Court is the 1970 Illinois
Constitution. Seven supreme court justices are elected from five districts:
three from the First Judicial District, which consists only of Cook County;
and one from each of the other four judicial districts. The Illinois
Constitution provides that boundaries of the four districts other than Cook
County are to be "of substantially equal population, each of which shall be
compact and composed of contiguous counties. ' g However, the judicial
district boundaries have not been redrawn decennially as have legislative
9
district lines, resulting in a disparity of population among the four districts.
Illinois is one of only nine states in which supreme court justices are
elected on partisan ballots.' ° The Constitution requires election of judges
but does not mandate nomination of candidates by parties; this is provided
for by statute." Once elected, a supreme court justice is subject to a
retention referendum after ten years in office, at which he must receive
"[t]he affirmative vote of three-fifths of the electors voting on the question"
to be returned for another term. 2
B. HOW ILLINOIS POLITICS IMPACTS ON SELECTION OF THE COURT

Illinois is dominated by an "individualistic" political culture. Its
politicians are party-oriented and skeptical of reformers. 3 This has
resulted in the state having minimal restrictions on campaign finance and
ethics. It has also made Illinois an unlikely candidate for "merit selection"

ed.).

8. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, §2.
9. See discussion infra Part V.
10. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 190-92 (1994

11. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (West 1996).
12. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, §12.
13. JACK R. VAN DER SLIK & KENT D. REDFIELD, LAWMAKING IN ILLINOIS, 15-24
(1986).
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of judges. Although there has been agitation for such a system periodically, the closest Illinois came to adopting one was a referendum placed before
the state's voters by the 1970 Constitutional Convention. That referendum
asked voters to choose between an elected or appointed judiciary, and voters
opted for the election scheme. 4
The two major political parties are competitive and nearly evenly
balanced in strength on a statewide basis, but Democratic Party adherents
are concentrated in Cook County and the deep southern portion of the state,
while Republicans largely exert control over Chicago's suburban "collar"
counties and the other downstate areas.' 5 As a result of these geographic
concentrations and the delineation of the state's judicial districts, the three
justices elected from Cook County and the justice elected in the southern
Fifth Judicial District have generally been Democrats, while the justices
elected from the suburban-dominated Second and central Illinois Third and
Fourth Judicial Districts have generally been Republicans. This has
translated into a 4-3 Democratic majority prevailing on the court for most
of the twenty-five years that the 1970 Constitution has been in effect.
Because of the Democratic Party's dominance of low-profile elections
in Cook County (and a judicial election fits this description), 6 victory by
a supreme court candidate in the Democratic primary election has been
tantamount to victory in the November general election. 7 Thus, examination of Cook County Democratic primary campaigns provides insight into
the political origins of the court's most significant bloc of justices.
It is generally assumed by Chicago political observers and participants
that in races with low voter interest, slating by the Democratic Party prior
to the primary election confers a huge advantage upon a candidate." In
December 1991, State Senate President Philip Rock was viewed as the frontrunner for the vacancy left by retiring Justice Clark, but Rock decided at the
last minute not to run. 9 Following Rock's withdrawal, the two candidates
competing most strongly for the party endorsement were then-appellate court
justice Mary Ann McMorrow and prominent personal injury attorney Philip

14. See JOE MATHEWSON, UP AGAINST DALEY 19-20 (1974).
15. VAN DER SLIK & REDFIELD, supra note 13, at 26.
16. See generally, MILTON RAKOVE, DON'T MAKE No WAVES, DON'T BACK No
LOSERS (1975).
17. See, e.g., Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote Cast at the General
Election, Nov. 6, 1990, at 104 (Democratic candidates for Supreme Court Justice winning
62.33 and 69.06 percent of the vote over their Republican opponents).
18. See RAKOVE supra note 16.
19. John Flynn Rooney, Rock Says He Won't Run For High Court, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Dec. 12, 1991, at 1.
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H. Corboy, Sr.2 ° Primary endorsements are granted by the Cook County
Democratic Central Committee, whose ward and township committeemen
cast weighted votes in proportion to the number of Democratic voters in
their jurisdictions.2 McMorrow had the backing of, among others, her
cousin, Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski, then boss of Chicago's 32nd
Ward. Corboy's principal backer was Illinois House Speaker Michael
Madigan, the 13th Ward committeeman. Madigan's rise to power had been
fueled in large part by campaign donations from the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association, one of whose leaders had been Corboy. 22
McMorrow emerged from a heated and closely contested slating session
with the endorsement.23 A day later, Corboy folded his candidacy.24
McMorrow then faced several candidates in the primary, her toughest
opponent being Michael Howlett, Jr. Howlett was the son of a former
Illinois secretary of state and gubernatorial candidate who had gone on to
achieve prominence in his own right as an associate judge and bar leader. 2,
Howlett spent $168,000 on television commercials for his campaign, while
McMorrow waged a traditional campaign, relying on committeemen to get
out the vote.26
When the votes were counted on March 17, 1992, McMorrow won with
29 percent of the vote. 27 Howlett received 21 percent, and six other
candidates received between five and ten percent each. 2" In November,
McMorrow easily beat her Republican opponent, Robert Buckley, with 69
percent of the vote.29
The most recent supreme court race in which a serious general election
campaign was mounted was that in the downstate Third District in 1990.
The candidates were two appellate court judges, Republican James D. Heiple

1.

20. Thomas Hardy, Democrats Slating Turns Chaotic, CHI.

TRIB., Dec.

20, 1991, at

21. See RAKOVE supra note 16.
22. Thomas Hardy, Madigan Sows, Reaps, Benefits From A Bumper Crop Of Power,
CHI. TRlB., Dec. 22, 1991, § 4 at 4.
23. Thomas Hardy, After Day, Corboy Out Of Race, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 1991, at 1,
9.

24. Id. at 1.
25. Profiles Of The Candidates Running For The Illinois Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 8, 1992, at 4.
26. Disclosure reports on file with the Illinois State Board of Elections, pursuant to the

Campaign Financing Act.
27. Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote Cast at the Primary Election,
General Primary, Mar. 17, 1992, at 187.
28. Id.
29. Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote Cast at the General Election, Nov.
3, 1992, at 120.
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of Tazewell County and Democrat Tobias Barry, who had represented
LaSalle and Bureau Counties in the state legislature for fourteen years.30
3
Neither had opposition in his respective primary election. '
Heiple won by a margin of only 2,827 votes, with 50.33 percent of the
total.3 ' Each candidate won a large plurality in his home county, while the
vote in other counties echoed that of the vote for University of Illinois
Trustees,33 indicating low voter interest and reflexive voting on a party
basis.34
II. PERCEPTIONS AND CRITICISMS OF THE COURT
Public attention was drawn to the Illinois Supreme Court in 1994 when
it ruled on a high-profile child custody case. A front-page article in a legal
trade paper, the National Law Journal,described the controversy and aired
criticisms of the court:
Unanimously overturning two lower courts, the justices on
June 16 revoked the adoption of a 3-1/2-year-old suburban Chicago boy known as Richard, and ordered him
returned to his biological father, now married to the
child's birth mother, even though he began living with his
adoptive family four days after he was born ....
It was the court's most contentious case of a turbulent
summer. The court in recent months has touched off a
firestorm of controversy, issuing one incendiary decision
after another, with reaction from the public, politicians
and the press fanning the flames. After the court reconsidered and reversed a number of high-profile decisions,
observers say the court- universally dubbed unpredictable and denounced by some as anti-intellectual- is
struggling through its inexperience to decide some of the
most difficult legal issues of the day.

at 174-75.
William Grady, High Court Races Getting Expensive, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1990

30. JiM EDGAR, ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, 1989-90,

31.
at A6.
32.
6, 1990,
33.
34.
at 50.

Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote Cast at the General Election, Nov.

at 105.

Id. at 105, 19-21.
For an explanation of this theory, see VAN DER SLIK & REDFIELD, supra note 13,

1998]

]LAW,
POLITICS, & THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

"Everything is embarrassing about the Supreme Courtits decision of cases, its administration of the court system
and its lack of procedural regularity," says a prominent
Chicago attorney who asked not to be identified.
The criticism has been building. In 1990, the Chicago
Council of Lawyers, an elite, reform-minded 1,300member bar, noted "a widespread perception among
members of the bar that the quality of the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently been below that of the
highest courts of other major states."
"It's a tiny bar association," scoffs the court's spokesman,
John Madigan. "Its only influence is to be available for
negative comments to reporters. This is a high-caliber
court."
All seven justices declined to be interviewed for this
article.
Perhaps of greatest concern among the bar here is the
court's June 27 administrative order limiting the number
and length of published intermediate appellate decisions.
At the same time, it amended a court rule to permit
summary disposition of intermediate appeals ....
"It's a court in transition," says Michael J. Howlett Jr. of
Chicago's Shefsky & Froelich Ltd., a former Cook
County judge who failed to win election to the high court
two years ago.
And it's experiencing "scrutiny by the media like no time
in its history," says Thomas A. Demetrio of Chicago's
Corboy Demetrio Clifford P.C., a past president of the
Chicago Bar Association ....
Lawyers here agree on one thing: The court is unpredictable. That is meant as a criticism by some and a compliment by others.
A federal judge in Chicago detects an "anti-intellectualism" about the court, and a prominent big-firm lawyer
says some of its opinions are like "thunderbolts" because
they cite no authority.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

But the president of the Illinois State Bar Association,
David A. Decker of Waukegan's Decker and Linn Ltd.,
says, "What I see is a relatively independent group of
people, all of whom are bright and experienced, and who
I think are doing a fine job."
Asserting that "the court was being stoned without
justification" over the Baby "Richard" decision, Mr.
Decker defended it against critics, including WGN radio's
Bob Collins. "Baby 'Richard' was a case where a
newspaper man, a radio personality and a governor all
attempted to gain a readership, ratings or political
advantage by criticising the Supreme Court with no basis
whatsoever," says Mr. Decker ....
The Illinois Supreme Court has not drawn this kind of
attention in decades. Unlike the high courts of California
and New York, it rarely has been at the forefront of the
common law or the administration of justice. The lone
exception was during the era of the late Walter V.
Schaefer, whom then-Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson appointed
in 1951 to the court, where he served for 25 years. He
was credited with restoring the court's integrity in the
1960s when a scandal forced two justices to resign.
The Council of Lawyers' 1990 criticisms still echo:
"Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court are rarely cited
elsewhere for the force of their logic or the power of their
insight. And the law in Illinois is often confused."35
A series of articles published in the Chicago Sun-Times in early 1996
also portrayed the court in unflattering light.
Critics say the court is arrogant, mean-spirited and
vindictive, a bunch of political hacks beholden to the
Democratic and Republican officials who helped elect
them. And, they say, these justices are just not, well,
judicial.
The court is an embarrassment, with not a legal scholar
among them, critics say.

35. Randall Sambom, Illinois Supreme Court Enters New, Rocky Era, NAT'L L. J., Oct.
10, 1994, at Al, A23.
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"Pretty actresses who can't act," said Daniel Polsby, a law
professor at Northwestern University. "Certainly, I can't
say these bozos are incompetent, but then you read the
Baby Richard case"....
The justices refused to talk to the Sun-Times.
And so did many of the court's critics, unless they could
remain anonymous.
Those included lawyers and judges, the people most
familiar with the court.
"You have a duty as an officer of the court not to bring
the court into disrepute, and that dissuades many people"
from comment, said attorney Robert Bergstrom. "The
court has the power to disbar you."....
Critics take direct aim at Chief Justice Michael A.
Bilandic, the former Chicago mayor, and Heiple, author
of the acerbic opinion in the Baby Richard case.
Bilandic, a product of Chicago's Democratic machine, and
Heiple, a Downstate Republican, form an unusual alliance,
apparently based on a friendship they forged after both
were elected to the court in 1990.
Together, critics say, Bilandic and Heiple lack judicial
temperament, lashing out at attorneys rather than trying to
be impartial referees, while imposing their will on fellow
justices.
"I think there's too much rancor, not publicly, internally,"
said one prominent-Chicago lawyer. "They're supposed
to be judicious. By their own actions, they've hurt their
stature."
Another lawyer added, "It's a politically sensitive court.
It's too political. 36
Some media comments about the court's political motivations have
been related to specific cases. For instance, when the Illinois Supreme
Court invalidated a term limits initiative in 1994, one newspaper reported

36. Tim Novak, Critics Label Panel an Embarrassment, CHI.
1996 at 10.

SUN-TIMES,

Feb. 25,
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that "Illinois lawmakers wanted the state Supreme Court to strip the term
limits question from the November ballot and they got their message across,
political analysts said . ... 'These guys aren't politically naive', political
science professor Paul Green said of the court. 'They know what's at
stake. All of them are political'."" In 1991, a columnist in the Chicago
Tribune accused the "Democrat-controlled Illinois Supreme Court" of
"conspir[ing] with ... Democratic lawmakers" in issuing a decision on
legislative redistricting."
Unfortunately, the lengthy Sun-Times article did not discuss the bases
of the opinions of the critics it quoted. The reference to "arrogance" may
have been inspired by the court's refusal to undergo auditing by the state
Auditor General, 9 or the questions related to Justice Heiple's temperament
that were aired during the 1997 judicial and legislative probes of his
conduct.'
This much is certain - by the time of Justice Heiple's resignation as
chief justice, there was general agreement that the court's image was in need
of burnishing, even from the new chief justice and leaders of the bar that
had for so long defended the court.4 ' But aside from Justice Heiple's
foibles, there has still been little public discussion of the causes of the
court's poor image.
It may be that some of the negative perception stems from the fact that
so many justices came to promininence as politicians rather than as lawyers,
scholars or jurists. Justices Ward, Clark, Simon, Calvo and Bilandic, for
instance, made their marks as elected Democratic Party officeholders in state
or local government before their elevations to the bench.42 Justices
McMorrow and Freeman were closely identified with Congressman Dan
Rostenkowski and Mayor Harold Washington, respectively.43 Justice

37. Analysts Say Supreme Court Justices Are Not Politically Naive, COLES COUNTY
DAILY TIMES-COURIER, Aug. 12, 1994 (LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File).
38. Thomas Hardy, GOP Has Upper Hand In Remap, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1991, at
4.
39. David Heckelman, Move To Audit Supreme Court Funds Defended, CHI.DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 24, 1992, at 1.
40. See, e.g., Justice James D. Heiple Report, (report of special Investigative
Committee of the Illinois House of Representatives) reprintedin Heiple Impeachment Report,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 16, 1997, V. 143, No. 97, p. 1 (special section).
41. Dave McKinney, Illinois Gets First Black ChiefJustice, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 13,
1997, at 1-2.
42.

JIM EDGAR, ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, 1987-88, at 158-59; GEORGE RYAN, ILLINOIS

BLUE BOOK, 1991-92, at 167, 169.
43. See Democrats Slating Turns Chaotic, supra note 20; David Axelrod & Mitchell
Locin, Mayor Comes In Firing, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1983.
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Dooley was president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, a
lobbying group for plaintiffs' lawyers." The court suffers from comparison to the United States Supreme Court: its sole ex-politician, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, is outnumbered by colleagues who are former corporate
lawyers and academics.4 5
It is now time to turn from discussion of the court's reputation to look
at how its actions over the past quarter century contribute to or rebut the
public perceptions.
Ill. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

State supreme courts are most often thought of as the arbiters of a
state's legal rules. But "one must also look at them as institutions of state
government, interacting with and both influencing and being influenced by
other political actors in the state."'
The Illinois Supreme Court is one of three independent branches of
government in the state. It does not generally have as high a profile as the
executive or legislative branch. Usually, ten years will pass before citizens
residing in the four downstate judicial districts see the name of their justice
on a ballot; an election for that seat may be held only once in two
decades.4 7 The inner workings of the court are secret to all but the judges,

44. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, 1991-1992 Desk Reference
Supplement at 4.
45. Oddly enough, when Chief Justice Bilandic made his first public comments after
the Sun-Times series on Oct. 31, 1996 (saying "the level of intellectual activity on our court
is impressive. This is a good court."), the former mayor of Chicago and City Council
member singled out his "good friend" [retired Justice] Clark for some reminiscing about
Chicago politics.
'With elections coming around, I'm reminded of a family that rivals the Daleys,'
Bilandic said. Clark's father, former Chicago Alderman John S. Clark, was 'a
powerhouse in Chicago from the days when it paid to be assessor and when it paid
to be chairman of the finance committee,' Bilandic said, getting a chuckle from the
audience.
Brendan M. Stephens, Bilandic Leaves 'Em Laughing At Judicial Conference, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Nov. 1, 1996, at 1.
46. G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIUS ALDIs PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION 41 (1988).
47. GEORGE RYAN, ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK 1995-96, at 468.
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their law clerks, and a few insiders.48 But the court has influence over
Illinois politics in a manner far disproportionate to public perception.
As the final authority in interpreting the state constitution, the court
may have occasion to decide, or decline to decide, which political party
controls the governor's office and the state legislature. The court determines
the extent to which Illinois' limited voter initiative provision may be used,
an issue of life-and-death importance to the state's political elites. And the
court has special powers in two areas of law that are of particular importance to key special interest groups; local home-rule tax policy and civil
justice reform. A political party or interest group which loses (or thinks it
will lose) in the electoral or legislative arena may petition the supreme court
to overturn the setback. The state constitutional milieu provides activist
judges with room to maneuver: United States Supreme Court decisions,
which are generally more deferential to other political bodies, are not
binding.
A. THE COURT IN PARTISAN DISPUTES

There is, quite often, comment in the popular media about judicial
decisionmaking in political cases.
Such commentary is not limited to Illinois. Alabama's Democratcontrolled Supreme Court has been accused of an anti-tort reform bias
attributable to campaign funding from Democrat trial lawyer contributors. 9
The Republican National Committee's chief counsel has been quoted as
saying of redistricting litigation, "We knew we would receive a fairer shake
from the courts than from any white Democratic legislature. Part of the
calculus was that there were a lot more Republicans on the bench in the
nineteen-nineties than there had been before." 50 In The Benchwarmers,1
Joseph Goulden recites several allegations by attorneys of federal judges
delaying or tailoring rulings to benefit their political sponsors.

48. As noted in the excerpts of the National Law Journal and Sun-Times articles,
justices generally do not speak to the press. A former law clerk told the author in a
confidential interview that law clerks are requested to maintain secrecy. Papers of deceased
justices are embargoed for twenty years following their retirements, according to librarians
at the University of Chicago Law School and the Illinois Historical Survey, where the papers
of Justices Schaefer and Underwood, respectively, are kept.
49. Edward Felsenthal, A Year After Election, Alabama's Chief Judge And His Foe
Battle On, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995; Steve Drinkard, Alabama's Judicial Future:A Look
Toward Judicial Selection Reforms, ALABAMA DEFENSE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL,

Oct. 1995.
50. Michael Kelly, SegregationAnxiety, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 46.
51.

JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS (1974)
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1. Relevant Literature
One of the few scholarly treatments of the Illinois Supreme Court's role
in state politics is found in a paper authored by Samuel Gove in 1980:
One area in which it is difficult to pinpoint political
influence is in the judicial process of the state courts. The
election of supreme court judges from districts after
nomination in primaries does permit open participation by
political parties, but information and background on
judicial decisions from the bench with political overtones
are another matter. All that can be analyzed is the written
opinions (and dissents, if any) and, if there is a divided
court, the voting of the judges.
Election of judges is often criticised as bringing politics
into the judicial process, and, in fact, most of those
elected judges in Chicago were [Democratic Party]
organization people ....
Only one election for the state supreme court has been
held since Daley's death. The 1976 primary for two
vacancies from Cook County was a disaster for the
organization, with two of its candidates (including Daley's
close associate, Joseph Power) defeated. Another significant defeat occurred in 1980, when independent Seymour
Simon upset organization candidate Francis Lorenz.
The Illinois Supreme Court has had a four to three
Democratic majority since the late 1960s. Very seldom,
however, do votes on a decision follow party lines;
instead they seem to follow ideological or other lines.
This is not too surprising, because the principle of stare
decisis (legal precedents) is used as the basis for decisions. Only when a case involves an election or when
other political matters come up do political overtones
occasionally arise. For example, in a decision handed
down in 1976 in a case involving the selection of national
convention delegates, the court ruled against the Democratic state central committee (Touhy v. State Board of
Elections). Two of the judges who had risen through the
Chicago Democratic organization filed dissents ....
.... [It is more] likely that the organization will continue
to try to nominate and elect its candidates for the impor-
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tant supreme court vacancies, hoping for more success
than it had in 1976. The political cases that arise will still
be decided on the merits of the case, the whims of the
judges, political considerations, or a combination of these
52

But while there has been much comment about political affiliation
affecting judicial outcomes, there has been little in the way of proof found
in empirical research. In Judicial Politics, Jerome R. Corsi lays out a
framework for analyzing the effect of politics on the judiciary.53 "Judicial
decisionmaking ... must be understood to operate in a complex arena in
which law and precedent are inevitably intermixed with personality,
prejudice, and politics." 54 Although judges explain their decisions in terms
of stare decisis, logic, or the meaning of constitutional statutory language,
Corsi argues, social science has identified human factors which are likely to
influence those decisions. "What before was conceptualized in terms of
jurisprudence must now be more clearly articulated as judicial politics."55
Richardson and Vines developed a model of judicial decisionmaking in
which judges are influenced by two overlapping sets of stimuli- a "legal
subculture" and a "democratic subculture." To a great extent, they argued,
judges are guided by legal precedent. But in some circumstances, they
argued, a judge turns to "democratic values" - considerations of personal
background, ideology, or political party.56
Applications of social science methods to judicial decisionmaking were
pioneered by Glendon A. Schubert, whose 1959 work made comprehensive
presentations of methods guided many of those who followed him.57 Over
the years, empirical studies have looked at several factors that may affect
judicial decisionmaking, including age, sex, education, income, religion, type
of law practice, and region of country.58 Some studies have attempted to
chart the influence of judges' ideologies on voting patterns, such as James
Leonard's survey of Ohio Supreme Court justices.59 These have been

52. SAMUEL GOVE, THE DALEY LEGACY, AFTER DALEY: CHICAGO POLITICS IN

TRANSITION, 210-11 (Samuel Gove and Louis Masotti, eds., 1982).
53. JEROME R. CORSI, JUDICIAL POLITICS (1984).

54. Id. at 257-58.
55. Id. at 258.

56.
(1993).
57.
58.
59.
Supreme

ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 275-91
GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959).

Id. at 263.
James Leonard, Ideology and Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study of the Ohio
Court: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 Terms, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1986).

19981

POLITICS, & THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
9]LAW,

criticized, however, as engaging in circular reasoning: "Attitudes derived
from cases are in turn used to explain cases. In other words, since there is
no independent identification of attitudes, the research assumes what it sets
out to prove .... "60
A number of empirical studies have attempted to find relationships
between judges' party affiliation and their voting behavior. Stuart S. Nagel
studied the voting behavior of 313 state and federal supreme court judges
in fifteen categories of cases, finding that Democrats were more likely to
favor "liberal" positions on issues.6' S. Sidney Ulmer looked at votes of
Michigan Supreme Court justices in unemployment and worker's compensation cases, noting that decisions in such disputes are "obviously a political
matter. That is, in most instances, the question reduces to who gets what and
how much." 62 He found that the consistency of Democratic justices voting
to uphold claims was "near-perfect" and "brute testimony to either the
strength of party affiliation in Michigan judicial politics or the unusual
homogeneity of social attitudes among those judges who wear the party
labels. 63
David Adamany studied workers' compensation appeals decided by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court over a ten-year period and found some correlation
between party and votes in favor of or against claimants, but to a smaller
degree than Ulmer found in Michigan.' Adamany attributed the discrepancy to the non-partisan nature of judicial campaigning (as opposed to nonpartisan elections, which both states have). This in turn was likely a
reflection of the states' different political cultures. At least three other
studies also focused on workers' compensation appeals,65 generally
supporting only the conclusion that "the effects of the party variable change
frequently across geographical boundaries and over time. 6 While the
effects of party affiliation are uncertain, one author concluded there is

60. CORSI, supra note 53, at 266.
61. Stuart S. Nagel, PoliticalPartyAffiliation and Judges' Decisions,55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 843 (1961).
62. S. Sidney Ulmer, The PoliticalParty Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11
J. PUB. L. 352, 355 (1962).
63. Id. at 361.
64. David Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a
Case Study, 63 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 57 (1969).
65. Edward Beiser & Jonathan Silberman, The Political Party Variable: Workmen's
Compensation in the New York Court of Appeals, 3 POLITY 521 (1971); J.Hemdon, The
Relationship Between Partisanship and the Decisions of State Supreme Courts, (unpublished
dissertation) (1964); Jamie Stecher, Democratic and Republican Justice: JudicialDecisionMaking on Five State Supreme Courts, 13 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 137 (1977).
66. See Stecher, supra note 65, at 178.
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certainly evidence that "political party [is] a predictor of judicial propensities
in criminal cases and, especially, in cases involving economic conflict. It [is]
also indicated in the multiple correlation context that the religious orientation of judges is an important predictor of their decisional propensities in
criminal cases and their pre-judicial association with the business world is
an important predictor in economic cases. 67 At least one study, of federal
District Court judges hearing civil liberties cases, found no correlation
between party and decisional outcomes.68
Philip Dubois studied partisan voting on eight state courts having
differing methods of judicial selection, concluding that "[w]here judges are
selected in highly partisan circumstances and depend upon a highly partisan
constituency for continuance in office, they may act in ways which will
cultivate support for that constituency, that is, exhibit partisan tendencies in
69
their judicial decision-making."
The Illinois Supreme Court has been the subject of two empirical
studies,70 the most recent of which looked at criminal, personal injury, and
miscelleneous civil cases decided during Justice Cunningham's second stint
on the court (1991-92) and found that "there is a relationship between party
affiliation and voting for traditional 'liberal' and 'conservative' positions."'"
Three principal weaknesses can be identified in the earlier studies.
First, by looking at decisions in areas of law in which decisions can be
explained as much by ideology as by party affiliation (bearing in mind that
a pre-existing ideology could well have drawn the judge to affiliate with his
party), such as unemployment or workers' compensation, the studies could
not determine whether party affiliation is actually the cause of the judges'
votes.72 Second, the earlier studies did not examine the circumstances of
the individual cases in the samples to provide a context for understanding
whether the rationales offered for the votes were supported by logic or

67. STUART S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS 252 (1975).
68. Thomas G. Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge

Decision Making, 6 L. & SOC'Y REV. 645 (1972).
69. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 148 (1980).
70. The first, Robert Bradley & S. Sidney Ulmer, An Examination of Voting Behavior
in the Supreme Court of Illinois: 1971-1975, 1980 S.ILL. U. L. J. 245, reached no conlusions
about the influences on the court or its politics.
71. Rick A. Swanson & Albert P. Melone, The PartisanFactorand JudicialBehavior
in the Illinois Supreme Court, 19 S.ILL. U. L. J. 303, 328 (1995).
72. "Of course, correlation alone does not indicate causation .. .Party affiliation
probably does not cause decisional propensities or liberal attitudes; it may, however, reinforce
pre-existing attitudes that are partially responsible for a judge's choice of political party."
STUART S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS 247 (1975).
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precedent, or rather appear to be post-hoc rationalizations. Finally, the
earlier authors only superficially explore the normative implications of their
findings.
A revealing study by Kathleen L. Barber of thirteen reapportionment
cases in Ohio and Michigan courts concluded "that partisan values assume
' 7
a significant role in the resolution of reapportionment controversies.
Barber's account is journalistic rather than scientific, but by focusing on
inherently political cases and discussing in detail the circumstances of each
case she was better able to isolate the partisan element of judicial
decisionmaking.
2. Methodology
TO determine the degree to which political party affects the behavior
of the Illinois Supreme Court, this paper examines six rulings in which rival
political parties' officeholders, candidates or surrogates were litigants. It is
hoped that this set of cases, in which the rawest political party interests are
at stake and in which votes would not be expected to follow ideological
lines, will control for ideology as a possible explanation of the votes.
The time frame for this study is cases decided since the 1970 Illinois
Constitution took effect. A total of forty-two individual votes are analyzed.
The cases were selected after review of cases cited in a publication of the
Illinois General Assembly's Legislative Research Unit, 1970 Illinois
Constitution Annotated for Legislators (1987), and other cases occurring
since that publication. Cases which are "political" in the sense that they
affect elections in the state but in which the state's two major political
parties are not adversaries, such as cases which involve intraparty disputes,
or disputes between "independent" reformers and the political establishment,
are not included in the survey, but those cases will be discussed briefly later.
As in previous studies, roll call votes are analyzed to determine "odds
ratios," representing the proportion of times a judge voted for the litigant of
his political party.74 Chi square is calculated to test for a relationship.
Roll call analysis is complicated by the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court
does not always publicly disclose justices' votes - if there is no dissenting
opinion, a decision in which the court was split will appear to the public to
have been unanimous.76 A recent decision pertaining to the selection of
73. Kathleen L. Barber, PartisanValues in the Lower Courts:Reapportionmentin Ohio
and Michigan, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 420 (1969).
74. This method is derived from ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING
AND POLrTCS IN THE FEDERAL DisTRicr COURTS 33 n.31 (1983).
75. See Swanson and Melone, supra note 71.
76. Tim Novak and Jon Schmid, Most Rulings Show No Sign of Disgareement, CHI.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

University of Illinois trustees will not be included in the roll call analysis
because no voting information is available.
It has been suggested that because most decisions of a court of last
resort do not generate controversy and have a limited impact on the political
system, "[s]tudying judicial behavior that occurs in a calm, non-hostile
climate may bring useful information to bear on existing assumptions about
the way courts operate."" This article does not hypothesize that judicial
decisionmaking in politically charged cases mirrors that in noncontroversial
cases. For this reason, the degree of party-line voting in the political cases
will be compared to that found in randomly selected decisions of the Illinois
Supreme Court.
3. The Cases
The cases selected are described below. Are the principles applied in
the cases consistent with the court's other rulings, or is there a divergence
that may be explained by the partisan variable?
78

Rock v. Thompson

The 1970 Constitution abolished the lieutenant governor's role as
president of the senate and gave the governor the responsibility of presiding
over that body until one of its own members was elected president.
Democrats won 30 of the 59 senate seats in the 1980 general election, but
when Governor James R. Thompson convened the senate, they were not
ready to organize the chamber. Governor Thompson proceeded with the
organization votes anyway, and the Republican minority elected one of their
own as senate president with 29 votes. Thompson refused to call a new
vote when the Democrats were ready, so the Democrats obtained a writ of

SuN-TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at 11 ("The court never discloses how any justice voted on a
particular case unless a justice writes the majority opinion, a dissent, or a concurring opinion.
In the absence of any written objection or support, the public is supposed to assume all of
the justices were in agreement, unlike the United States Supreme Court, which often
discloses exactly how each justice voted . . . . 'There's some pressure against dissenting
from the court,' said Steven Tomashefsky, president of the Chicago Council of Lawyers, a
frequent critic of the court. 'We have been told frequently that opinions are issued as
unanimous opinions even when the justices are not unanimous."'); see also John Flynn
Rooney, CandidatesAir Views On "Secret" Court Decisions, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Feb. 7,
1992, at 2.
77. Traciel V. Reid, Judicial Policymaking and Implementation: An Empirical
Examination, W. POL. Q. 509 (1987).
78. 426 N.E.2d 891 (I11.1981).
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mandamus from the supreme court ordering the governor to do so. The
court issued the writ on a 4-3 party line vote. The opinions discussed the
propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.
In Re Contest of Election for Governor:9
In the 1982 gubernatorial election, incumbent Governor Thompson
defeated challenger Adlai E. Stevenson I by a mere 5,000 votes.
Stevenson filed a petition for a recount with the state supreme court. The
court's Republican justices, joined by a Democrat, Justice Simon, decided
sua sponte to strike the petition, holding that the election challenge statute
was unconstitutional because it provided for three-judge panels.
Reed v. Norman"0
In 1990 a group of black political activists, backed surreptitiously by
the Republican Party,"' filed petitions to run for Cook County offices under
the banner of the "Harold Washington Party." Cook County Democrats,
fearing that the presence of the third party on the ballot would draw votes
from Democratic candidates, challenged the petitions and won a ruling from
the Democrat-dominated County Officers Electoral Board and Circuit Court
On appeal, the Supreme Court's four
invalidating the candidacies.
Democratic justices issued an unsigned order upholding the lower tribunals,
promising that a written opinion would "later be filed setting forth the
reasons supporting this order." In the end, no such opinion was ever filed.
The United States Supreme Court, with only Justice Scalia dissenting, later
overturned the decision.82
People ex rel Burris v. Ryan 3
The General Assembly was unable to agree on a redistricting plan for
itself in 1991, and pursuant to the state constitution, a Legislative Redistricting \Commission was appointed to attempt to reach a compromise. That
Commission, consisting of equal numbers of Democratic and Republican

79. 444 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. 1983).
80. No. 70833 (unpublished order, Oct. 12, 1990).
81. See Ann Marie Lipinski & Hanke Gratteau, Edgar Shows GOP Can Win Black
Votes, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1990, at 1.
82. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
83. 588 N.E.2d 1023 (I11.1991) [hereinafter Ryan 1]; 588 N.E.2d 1033 (Ill. 1992)
[hereinafter Ryan I1].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

members, also failed to agree on a new map, so a tie-breaking member was
chosen at random, giving the panel a Republican majority. When a
gerrymandered map favorable to the Republicans was adopted, Democrats
filed a challenge in the supreme court.
The court first issued an order, on a 4-3 party line vote, invalidating the
district plan and remanding it to the Commission.84 The Commission
made some slight changes in its map and resubmitted to the court. This
time, however, one of the court's Democrats, Justice Cunningham, switched
sides and voted with the three Republican justices to uphold the map. 85
The full story behind the switch was not aired until a Democratic state
legislator filed a petition for relief from the Ryan 11 judgment, alleging that
Justice Cunningham had improperly switched his vote between Ryan I and
Ryan I for political reasons. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the
legislator's petition without comment86 but Justice Harrison, dissenting, laid
out the true circumstances surrounding the Ryan cases, which had not
previously been acknowledged in any justice's opinion:
The three members elected to this court as Democrats
found that neither map [adopted by the Legislative
Redistricting Commission in Ryan I and then Ryan II]
satisfied constitutional standards and voted to reject both.
On the other hand, the three members elected as Republicans all voted to approve the Jourdan III-A (Republican)
map. The deciding vote was cast by Justice Joseph
Cunningham... who was appointed by this court to fill
the vacancy created by the death of Justice Horace Calvo.
Justice Cunningham cast his vote for the Republican map,
and, in an opinion which Cunningham authored, the map
was approved. [Citing Ryan I1]
Justice Cunningham began his judicial career as a justice
of the peace in St. Clair County and advanced to the post
of chief circuit judge before being appointed to this court.
Because all of this was accomplished under the auspices
of the Democratic Party, Cunningham's decision to back
the Republican map, notwithstanding its constitutional
infirmities, struck some as more than a little unusual.
Proponents of the Republican map no doubt convinced
84. Ryan 1, 588 N.E.2d at 1029.
85. Ryan II, 588 N.E.2d at 1036.
86. People ex rel Burris v. Ryan, 634 N.E.2d 1066 (II1. 1994) [hereinafter Ryan
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themselves that Cunningham's judgment was simply the
triumph of clear thinking over personal politics. As it
turns out, just the opposite may have been true.
In the petition for post-judgment relief [the court was
presented with] the transcript of a deposition given by
Justice Cunningham in a libel case wholly unrelated to
this dispute. In that deposition, Cunningham testified that
while the redistricting dispute was underway, he attended
a dinner party at the MAC, an exclusive men's club in St.
Louis, Missouri, along with a number of Democratic and
Republican circuit judges, a Republican appellate judge
and their wives. At that party, he announced his intention
to run for election to the supreme court in 1992. Such a
declaration would not have been noteworthy except that
Cunningham revealed he would run not as a Democrat but
as a Republican [and] was considering running as a
Republican because "I think, if anything, I may have been
ticked off at the Democratic Party for not asking me if I
'sT
wanted to run, to give me the option to say no.'
The dissent is something of a landmark for two reasons. First, it
appears to be the first time that a justice acknowledged that party-line voting
takes place in political cases. The second, of course, is its acknowledgment
that a judge would crassly change his vote out of personal political
ambition. Airing either of these "articles of dirty laundry" must have been
tremendously embarrassing. As it was, it appeared that the airing was
reluctant - no majority opinion was ever filed.
Several cases which are not included in the set are worth mentioning
because they demonstrate the court's important role in Illinois politics and
the difficulty in developing a systematic selection criteria for a set of
political cases.
Shrage v. State Board of Elections88/Rybicki v. State Board of
Elections9
In 1981, the drawing of former Democratic Governor Samuel Shapiro's
name from Abraham Lincoln's hat to become the tie-breaking member of
the Legislative Redistricting Commission resulted in the adoption of a legis87. Id. at 1067.

1981).
88. 430 N.E.2d 483 (11.
89. 574 F.Supp 1082 (N.D.III. 1982).
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lative remap extremely favorable to the Democratic Party. Republicans felt
that the remap was unfair to them and decided to challenge it. But instead
of taking the challenge to the supreme court, which had original jurisdiction
to entertain it, Republicans decided to go to the federal District Court,
apparently because they felt that non-partisan federal judges would be more
receptive to their case than would the Democrat-dominated state court. 9°
The Republicans ultimately did not prevail in federal court. 9' One
maverick Republican state legislator did take a redistricting claim to the
supreme court and the court redrew her rather egregiously gerrymandered
district.92 This case is not included in the set because it did not represent
a battle between the state's parties and because there was no dissenting
opinion. These cases tell us little about the operation of the supreme court,
but much about the perception of the court's political leanings on the part
of state lawmakers.
People v. Pine93
This case differs from those in the set in that only one politician,
Secretary of State Jim Edgar, was a party. The defendants were three
individuals charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Edgar
intervened in their cases, contending that he should not be required to issue
them judicial driving permits during their DUI drivers license suspensions.
Because the defendants' license suspensions had expired by the time the
case reached the supreme court, they had no stake in the case's outcome and
declined to participate. The court allowed the Illinois State Bar Association
to argue their side, setting up a confrontation between the politically
ambitious Republican secretary of state, who had made DUI crackdowns the
hallmark of his political career, and the usually Democrat-aligned bar
association.94

90.
interview
91.
92.

This was confirmed by one of the Republican Party's attorneys in a confidential
with the author.
Rybicki, 574 F.Supp. at 1082.
Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483 (I11.1981).

93. 542 N.E.2d 711 (111. 1989).
94. I characterize the ISBA, as well as the Chicago Bar and Illinois Trial Lawyer
Associations, as being Democrat-aligned because of the prominence of their leaders and staffs
in the Democratic Party as contributors, candidates, and officeholders. It should be noted,

however, that a survey reported in JOHN P. HEINZ AND EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) found that while there are overlaps

in patterns of acquaintance among notable Chicago lawyers with affinity to the CBA and the
Regular Democratic Organization, there is no relationship between individual membership
in the CBA or ISBA and Democratic Party adherence.
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The court, on a 4-3 vote, upheld Edgar's right to intervene. One
Democrat, Justice Ward, voted with the three Republicans to back Edgar.
Because individual Illinois residents were directly affected by this ruling,
and because the justices' votes could be explained by ideology as well as
party, it was not included in the set.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections95
A petition for a ballot initiative to limit the terms of Illinois state
legislators was filed by maverick political reformers in 1994. At the time,
term limits were viewed as somewhat pro-Republican because most state
legislators were Democrats and the Democratic Party had controlled the
legislative branch, while being shut out of the governor's mansion for most
of the previous two decades,96 and because Republican candidates were
more likely to favor them.97 However, it is clear that Republican, as well
as Democratic, officeholders have mixed feelings about whether they want
to subject themselves to truncated political careers, and for this reason it was
not included in the set.98

95. 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994).
96. GEORGE RYAN, ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK 1995-96, at 461, 470-71.
97. Robert D. Novak, Testing-Time for Term Limits, THE WEEKLY

STANDARD, Nov.
4, 1996 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
98. Coalition for Public Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138 (Ill.
1976). This case involved a ballot initiative sponsored by Patrick Quinn, a maverick reformer
unpopular with leaders of both of Illinois major political parties. The 1970 Constitution

provides for only a limited initiative and referendum pertinent to "structural and procedural

subjects" contained in the legislative article. Id.
The initiative attempted to rewrite the article to prohibit dual officeholding by
legislators, and prevent legislators from collecting their salaries in advance or voting on
questions in which they had a conflict of interest. In a decision which has sparked mild
controversy to this day, the court took a literal reading of the Constitution's referendum
provision and held that a proposed initiative must contain both structural and procedural
subjects, rather than be simply be structural or procedural in the sense of not pertaining to
a substantive area of legislation. Id.
While this case was highly charged politically, it represented a battle between the
state's political establishment and outsiders, rather than between the two parties. As such, if
the decision tells us anything about the court, it is that the court may be more sympathetic
to leaders of both parties than to those perceived as outsiders or agitators.
In the 1994 term limits case, the court, again citing the "structural and procedural"
clause, refused to allow a proposition to go before voters. The vote was 4-3, with one
Republican, Justice Nickels, joining three Democrats in the majority and one Democrat,
Justice Harrison, joining the two Republicans in dissent. Like the Coalitionfor Political
Honesty cases before it, this case may demonstrate a propensity on the part of the justices
to support the political establishment over outsiders.
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Tully v. Edgar9 9
In 1995, the Republican-dominated legislature reorganized the state
university system and, in so doing, changed the method of selecting the
University of Illinois Board of Trustees. Trustees had been chosen in
general elections, but the legislature decided to make the board an appointed
body with trustees chosen by the governor. The new law ended the terms
of incumbent trustees - most of whom were Democrats, and who were, in
fact, the only Democratic statewide elected officials remaining after the 1994
election.'0° The supreme court overturned the portion of the law eliminating incumbent trustees' terms. There was no written dissent so it is not
known how the justices voted. It is interesting to speculate if the court may
have divided along party lines to back the Democrats, but in light of the
recent negative publicity, agreed to suppress any written dissent.
4. Findings
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Republican justices' names are in CAPITALS, except for Justice
Cunningham, who changed parties while in office.
CROSS-TABULATION OF PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING IN
POLITICAL CASES

Pro-Democratic Votes

Pro-Republican Votes

Democrats

Republicans

2

20

20

0

To the extent that the set of political cases is valid, there would appear to
be a relationship between party affiliation and voting in political cases
(x2=362.94, df=l), significant at the .01 level.
5. Analysis
The Illinois Constitution contains many generalities, and, as noted
earlier, United States Supreme Court precedents are not binding on the
Illinois Supreme Court. As a result, to use the terms of the Richardson and
Vines model, Illinois justices have a great ability to allow the "democratic
subculture" influence their votes.
Looking at the six rulings in the four cases, we do not see decisions
that can be explained by adherence to precedent or by ideology. The fact
that there were 4-3 split decisions in all the cases demonstrates that
precedents, if any, could lead to opposite conclusions. Writing for the
majority in the Contest of Election decision, Justice Ryan applied the
holding from a case in which he had specially concurred."' The Democratic dissenters in Contest of Election cited nine precedents holding that
constitutional issues could not be raised by a court sua sponte, a canon of
judicial restraint which is usually cited by Republicans.
Reed v. Norman involved an issue generally affected by an ideological
bias, but again the results were the opposite of what one would expect: The
three Republicans, who ordinarily would be considered the court's "conservatives," took a pro-civil liberties approach in voting to allow the third party
candidates on the ballot, while the four Democrats took the more restrictive
approach. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, only its
most conservative member, Justice Scalia, voted to uphold the ruling of the
four "liberal" Illinois justices.

101. See People ex rel Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1975).
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The Democratic justices in Ryan I and Ryan II had argued that
redistricting plans must take into account "communities of interest." A
review of the case law on this doctrine does not reveal an association with
either party or ideology. It has been applied by federal court panels with
Republican majorities'02 and bipartisan majorities.' °3
The author is unable to fathom whether there could be a "conservative"
view or a "liberal" view of granting writs of mandamus or post-judgment
petitions, the technical issues decided in Rock and Ryan III.
It is clear that the justices are more likely to vote along party lines in
the political cases than in other types of cases.
Reproduced below is Swanson and Melone's cross tabulation of party
and "liberal" versus "conservative" votes from their random sample of nonunanimous cases decided during Justice Cunningham's tenure.'
(Their
data may not be precisely correct in view of what we now know to be
Justice Cunningham's party switch in 1991, but is nevertheless a good
overview of what general voting patterns could be expected to look like.)
It is plain that the numbers are very different from those in the "political"
cases:
CROSS-TABULATION OF PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING IN ALL NONUNANIMOUS CASES

Liberal Vo tes
Conservative Votes

I

Democrats
159
52

Republicans
59
99

The cross-product ratio, or odds ratio, in the political cases is 10.0,
indicating that justices' votes in favor of their own political party are ten
times more likely than votes against their political party. In contrast, the
odds ratio in the randomly selected cases is 5.137. In other words, party
affiliation is nearly twice as likely to explain a vote in a political case than
it is in a non-unanimous, non-political case. (If political party had no effect
on voting behavior in political cases, the odds ratio would be 1.0, indicating
independence or no relationship.))

102. See Prosser v. Elections Board, 793 F.Supp 859 (W.D.Wis. 1992).
103. See Skolnick v. Electoral Board, 336 F.Supp 839 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (The majority

consisted of a Democratic appointee and a Republican appointee; a Democratic appointee
dissented).

104. Swanson & Melone, supra note 71, at 320.
105. See CARP AND ROWLAND, supra note 74, at 33.
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Correcting Swanson and Melone's data to reflect Justice Cunningham's
switch, in their samples of eighteen non-unanimous criminal cases and
fourteen non-unanimous personal injury cases, the justices split along party
lines once and twice respectively." ° In their sample of thirty-five nonunanimous civil cases, the justices split along party lines just three times,
one of the cases being the second redistricting ruling."° The Chicago
Sun-Times reported that its analysis of 311 decisions issued between 1993
and November 1995 found no cases in which the justices divided along
party lines.'0 8
It should perhaps be noted at this point that the political dynamics
discussed heretofore probably also apply to lower courts in Illinois, in which
selection procedures are identical and judges have similar backgrounds.
Republicans have criticized the Cook County judiciary as being loyal
to the Democratic Party and its constituent interest groups. For instance,
when Cook County Circuit Judge Aaron Jaffe struck down a Republicanpassed measure in May 1996:
House Speaker Lee Daniels ... accused Jaffe of doing
the bidding of [then-House Minority Leader Michael]
Madigan, Daniels' longtime nemesis, and said it symbolized the need to improve Cook County's judiciary through
merit selection.
Republican Senate President James "Pate" Philip called
the decision "ridiculous."
"If I say it's political, that's the understatement of the
year," Philip said."
Similarly, when Republican Governor Jim Edgar was asked to comment on
his likelihood of prevailing in a court battle to reopen Chicago's Meigs Field
airport, Edgar said, "I don't kid myself. There's a tendency in Cook County
courts that we [Republicans] don't do too well.' ' 10

106. Swanson & Melone, supra note 71, at 316-18.
107. Id. at 315.
108. Tim Novak & Jon Schmid, Most Rulings Show No Sign of Disagreement, CHI.
SuN-TimEs, Feb. 25, 1986, at 11.
109. Andrew Fegelman & Rick Pearson, Packaging 3 Laws In 1 Takes A Hit In Court,
CHi. ThB., May 8, 1996, at 1.
110. Rick Pearson & Gary Washburn, City Pays State, Says It Plans To Shut Meigs,
CHI. TMIB., Sept. 11, 1996, at 1.
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B. THE COURT AS INTEREST GROUP ARBITER

"The power of courts to review the constitutionality of legislative and
executive action, commonly called the power of judicial review, constantly
involves American courts in conscious policymaking." 11' As is the case
when policy is made by the legislature or executive, interest groups will
attempt to influence policymaking by the judiciary, most visibly by filing
"test cases" seeking a determination of a law's constitutionality, or by
submitting amicus curiae briefs." 2 But in at least two states, Alabama and
Texas, where judges are chosen in partisan elections, it is widely known that
interest groups have taken to campaigning for and against judicial candidates
much as they do in elections for offices in the so-called political branches
of government." 3
How do interest groups and the courts interact? The typical description
of the legal process, portrayed to the public by the legal community and
reinforced through judicial codes of ethics, holds that independent and
impartial courts apply "the law" to a set of facts and reach a logical
conclusion, unaffected by sympathy or prejudice. The role of interest
groups in the process, like that of any other litigant or potential litigant, is
severely circumscribed. The Canons of the American Bar Association's
Code of Judicial Conduct dictate that a judge be "unswayed by partisan
interests,"" 4 "neither initiate or consider ex parte or other communications
concerning a pending or impending proceeding,""' should not participate
in an organization "conducted for the economic or political advantage of its
members,"". and "should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his
judicial office."" 7 Thus, litigants come to court with the scales of justice
evenly balanced and can expect a fair and impartial decision in their dispute.
This idealized notion of judicial independence could be said to stand at one
extreme of a range of models of interest group impact on the political
process.
At the other end of this range would be the economists' point of view,
described most brutally by Magee and his colleagues, of how interest groups

111. HERBERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: COURTS, LAWYERS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 38 (1984).

112. Id.
113. See Matt Smith, Trial Lawyers Blast Critics Of Judiciary, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Sept. 15, 1994 (LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File); Wayne Slater, Lawyers'
Donations Assailed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 14, 1994, at 23A.
114. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(l) (1989).
115. Id. at Canon 3A(4).
116. Id. at Canon 5B.
117. Id. at Canon 7.
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seek to obtain advantages for themselves in legislative bodies."' According to Magee, interest groups, by spending money on lobbying and
campaign contributions, purchase goodwill from politicians and political
parties to produce policies that redistribute wealth to their constituents.
Economists call this process rentseeking. In this model, the officeholder's
primary motivation is retaining his office. Political parties use obfuscation
to disguise the purpose of their policies when they fear the public will be
offended. Because the purpose of the interest groups' lobbying is usually
to redistribute, rather than create wealth, the system often benefits the
interest groups at the expense of society as a whole." 9
One would expect a system of merit appointment of judges, combined
with lifetime tenure, to produce a system most like the idealized model. As
more incidents of the political process are added to the judicial selection
system, such as popular elections, partisan ballots, interest group endorsements and campaign contributions, one might expect interest group influence
on courts to increase.
1. Relevant Literature
Most of what has been written about interest groups' interaction with
the judiciary has been written about the United States Supreme Court and
other federal courts.'" It is clear that much of this research is inapposite
to those state courts which, unlike the federal judiciary, are not insulated
from politics by the appointment process or life tenure.
A comprehensive bibliography of works on interest groups and the
courts is collected in Lee Epstien et al., Public Interest Law. "' Epstein
traces the recognition of interest groups' attempts to influence the courts to
early political science texts by Arthur Bentley and David Truman. To this
day, texts on interest groups in American politics usually include chapters
on the courts. 22
Epstein, in chronicling interest group litigation before the United States
Supreme Court, suggests four reasons why interest groups will turn to the

118.
THEORY

STEPHEN MAGEE, ET. AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY

(1989).

119. In deciding whether to support an interest group's request, a legislator probably
also takes into account the possibility that voters might revolt and punish him for siding with
that interest, so voters' present and potential policy preferences also play an important role.

See R.

DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990).

120. See Bradley & Ulmer, supra note 70, at 247.
121.

LEE EPSTIEN ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (1992).

122. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, (1986).
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courts: (1) the group has been traditionally disadvantaged in seeking relief
from the legislative or executive branch; (2) the group seeks to balance the
presentation made by another group; (3) to "convince jurists to adopt their
version of the 'appropriate' interpretation of the laws;" or (4) to cut the
group's losses in the event that
the legislative or executive branch's decision
123
did not go the group's way.
Epstein surveyed amicus curiae briefs in the United States Supreme
Court to document interest activity in the judicial branch. Use of this
method has been criticized as "blowing out of proportion" the importance
of amicus appearances relative to more proactive litigation strategies such
l
as the use of test cases and for being used primarily because of its ease. 2
This view is undoubtedly correct - for instance, the challenge to Illinois
1976 medical malpractice reform law was undoubtedly coordinated by the
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, yet their name does not appear in the
case report as either a party or amicus. Also, appearances do not reflect
attempts to submit briefs that are rejected by a court. In hearing the
challenges to the 1995 tort reform law, the Illinois Supreme Court initially
declined to accept any briefs from groups representing economic interests
and took them only from "public interest" groups. 25 Nevertheless, amicus
appearances are probably a good gauge of an interest group's consciousness
of and planning for a litigation strategy and perhaps of the group's own
perception of its ability to sway the court. 26 They have increased in
frequency in recent years.' 27 For those reasons, amicus appearances are
emphasized in this paper.
Melinda Gann Hall, in a study of voting behavior by supreme court
judges in four southern states, found that judges acted differently on death
penalty appeals when they anticipated electoral opposition. This, Hall
concluded, confirmed "important linkages between political processes and
2

judicial behavior."'1 1

But no evidence has been found heretofore that formal judicial selection
methods impact on court outcomes. Burton Atkins and Henry Glick,
comparing the degree of support given to various appellants by five
123. Lee Epstien, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J. L. &
POL. 639 (1993).
124. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 122, noting that it is "comparatively easy
to acquire information about it simply by examining reported cases."
125. David Heckelman, Tort Reform Law Biased Against Women, Blacks, Briefs
Contend, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 25, 1997, at 1.
126. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 122, at 372.
127. Id.
128. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in Southern State
Courts, 54 J.POL. 427 (1992).
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categories of courts, found no statistically different treatment of governmental, criminal, corporate, or "underdog" litigants.'2 9 They did note that
support for underdog litigants was higher in courts where judges are elected
on partisan ballots, but cautioned that the difference could be attributed to
regional variation because most such courts are in the South.
William M. Landes and Richard Posner developed an economic model
of how an independent judiciary facilitates interest group activity in
legislatures. Referring to the Congress and the federal courts, Landes and
Posner argued that an independent judiciary would encourage rentseeking,
since interest groups 'Wouldhave some assurance that courts would enforce
legislation in accordance with the intentions of the enacting legislature,
rather than be swayed by the desires of subsequently elected legislatures that
3 ° Thus,
might disagree with the legislation that was passed earlier on.
lobbying costs would render greater value due to legislation's longer
potential lifespan.
Landes and Posner recognized "the possibility that although the
judiciary is independent of the political branches, interest groups will
intervene directly with judges to undo the results of an earlier legislative
But, they noted, success in such an endeavor was unlikely,
process."''
Of course, like
given institutions such as life tenure and judicial ethics.'
and not
judiciary
federal
the
on
focused
so many others, these scholars were
on state judiciaries where circumstances differ greatly. There is significant
evidence that interest groups and judiciaries in states where judges are
elected behave much differently than they do in federal courts.
In a 1966 article, Lewis A. Froman, Jr. attempted to chart the effects
of interest group strength on state constitutions. 33 Froman used classifications of states as having strong, moderate or weak interest groups, developed
by surveying members of the American Political Science Association, as his
independent variable and, inter alia, whether a state's court of last resort was
elected or not as dependent variable. Froman found that 79% of states
regarded as having strong interest groups had elected courts, compared to

129. Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State
Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974).
130. William M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
131. Id. at 885-86.
132. Id.
133. Lewis A. Froman, Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics, AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 952 (1966).
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57% of states with moderate interest group strength, and only 43% of states
13 4
with weak interest groups.
Froman concluded that strong interest groups would believe that "on
balance, they might be better able to influence the selection of personnel if
such persons were elected in what, for minor positions, would be relatively
low turnout elections than take a chance with governors," who "are likely
to be responsive to a wide variety of state interests.' ' 135 Froman felt this
conclusion was buttressed by the fact that judges in states with strong
interest groups had shorter average terms of office.
Froman cautioned that his use of judgmental measures of interest group
strength was a "probably less valid and less reliable technique,' 1 36 and
indeed, if the respondents to the APSA survey agreed with the same premise
Froman started with - that interest groups would like to keep certain
offices elective - they may have considered the fact that a state retained
long ballots in making their assessments of interest group strength.
Nevertheless, Froman's conclusion has been borne out by anecdotal evidence
in Illinois.'37
2. Comparing the interaction between organized interest groups and state
courts of last resort: Illinois and other states
To gain perspective on how the partisan elective system of choosing
Illinois Supreme Court justices may affect court outcomes or the way that
interest groups try to influence court outcomes, I looked at how amicus brief
activity and certain decisions in interest group sensitive cases differed
among state supreme courts with varying judicial selection methods.
a. Amicus Brief Activity
I studied amicus curiae participation by non-governmental entities in
state courts of last resort in a sample stratified according to five different
methods of judicial selection and retention: partisan head-to-head elections;
partisan elections with retention referenda; non-partisan elections; gubernatorial appointment; and merit selection, according to descriptions provided by
The Book of the States. 31 Merit selection refers to appointments, usually
by the governor, of judges from lists of candidates approved by non-partisan
screening panels. Judges in three states are appointed by the legislature; I

134. Id. at 960.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 954.
137. See discussion Part V infra.
138. THE BOOK OF THE

STATES,

supra note 10.
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felt this number was too few to yield a valid research sample, so those
courts are not studied in this paper. A caveat: a categorization of judicial
selection methods is not "hard" - lawyers could disagree with a characterization of, say, Ohio's system, as being partisan; in that state, primary
elections are partisan but general elections are non-partisan.
The sample consisted of a number of states in roughly a 1:3 proportion
to the number of states having each method. In each category I tabulated
amicus briefs from the largest states in which amicus parties are identified
in case reporters (in some states, notably California, Texas, and Georgia, the
amicus entities are not identified, making it virtually impossible to study
them) from the period of July 1992 through June 1996.
The entities were classified as corporations; labor organizations;
business, trade, or professional associations, and citizen, advocacy, public
interest, or charitable organizations. 39 When a brief was submitted on
behalf of more than one entity and the entities fit more than one category,""4 the brief was assigned to the category that fit the majority of the
entities on the brief. Briefs in which the sponsoring entities were equally
divided between categories were assigned to alternating categories.
In the United States Supreme Court, a large portion of group litigants
have represented racial, ethnic, or ideological viewpoints, .as opposed to
purely economic interests. 41 This is no doubt due to the special role that
the United States Supreme Court plays in protecting minority or political
participation rights as distinguished from economic rights. But the picture
in the Illinois Supreme Court is quite different.
The accompanying table breaks down amicus curiae activity in the
Illinois Supreme Court, probably the best indication of interest group
participation in a court since discerning a proceeding was brought as a test
case can be difficult. According to information compiled by Epstien, "public
interest" groups representing a demographic or ideologically oriented group
constitute a slight majority of the special interest amici appearing before the
United States Supreme Court, while organizations representing economic
interests are a slight minority. 4 2 In contrast, 82 percent of Illinois
Supreme Court amicus briefs filed by special interest groups come from
economic interests.

139. The categories are per Epstein, supra note 123.
140. For instance, many amicus briefs in tort cases are submitted jointly by plaintiffs'
lawyer groups and labor unions.
141. See Epstien, supra note 123.
142. See Id.
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AMICUS BRIEF AcTIvITY IN THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
JULY 1992-JuNE 1996

23

15%

98
(66)
(32)
(9)
(5)
(20)
3

64%
(43%)
(21%)
(6%)
(3%)
(13%)
2%

29

18%

The table below shows how amicus participation in the Illinois Supreme
Court compares with that in other states.

58
62
76
46
66
56
55

21
21
12
6
22
21
19

21
18
7
34
22
31
40

17
15
15
18
11
9
3

4
5
2
0
0
4
1

42
52

7
5

42
33

7
7

9
8
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Non-Partisan.Election States (542:
Brefs)

Michigan(W)
Washington(S)
Wisconsin(W)
Minnesota(W)
Partisan Election/Retention States
(25OBriefs____
Penn. (M)
I.llinois(M)

_

__

_

_

_

48
60
79
72

14
22
14
19

34
28
32
32

12
10
1
3

6
2
9
7

59
64

14
21

12
18

16
15

12
2

Partisan Election.

States

(368 Briefs)

Ohio (M)
North,, Carolina (S)

_

__

63
59

_

_

_

_

26
21

18
26

__

__

9
14

10
1

The median proportion of public interest groups to all groups
participating as amici is 28 percent. In Illinois, it is 18 percent, placing
Illinois in the bottom four of the seventeen courts studied.
I had hypothesized that the proportion of economic interest groups
participating as amici might be related to a court's selection method,
reasoning that since such groups are more likely to contribute to judges'
political campaigns, they might seize the opportunity to communicate their
preferences to a sympathetic tribunal.
In fact, the proportion of economic interests submitting amicus briefs
appears to be more related to the strength of such interest groups in a state.
'In the table below is a cross tabulation of amicus group activity with interest
43 In all
group strength as characterized by Sarah McCally Morehouse.'
states classified as having "weak" interest groups, the percentage of public
interest amicus briefs is above 31, while in all states regarded as having
"strong" or "moderately strong" interest groups, the percentage of public
interest amici is below 34. The difference is significant at the .01 level
(x2=56.5, df=l).

143.
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CROSS TABULATION OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND AMICUS
PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC INTEREST AND ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS

Judicial Selection

Method

_

Number of Briefs

Interest,

_Public

Partisan Election
AllOthers

473
114

Economic Interest
1076
504

CROSS TABULATION OF INTEREST GROUP STRENGTH AND AMIcus
PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC INTEREST AND ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS

Interest Group Strength7
Strong or Moderate.
Weak

Number of Briefs
Public Interest,
258
329

Economic Interest
980
600

In her study of state high court amicus activity, Epstien identified the
organized bar as interest group "filing or co-signing briefs in increasing
numbers."'"
Surprisingly, Epstien failed to note that organizations of
plaintiffs' lawyers file by far the lion's share of such briefs. I found that
such groups filed between 12 and 26 percent of all non-governmental
organization briefs in fourteen of the seventeen states in'the sample, with a
sample median percentage of 21. In Illinois, amicus participation by the
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association is at that 21 percent level. Overall
participation by all segments of the bar (including general bar associations
such as the Illinois State Bar Association and Chicago Bar Associations, and
civil and criminal defense bar organizations) constitutes 43 percent of the
non-governmental organizations appearing as amici.
b. Interest Group Sensitive Cases
I examined decisions of state courts of last resort in which two of the
most controversial types of tort reform statutes - damages caps and
medical malpractice screening panels - were challenged as violating state
constitutional provisions. Using a Westlaw search, I found thirty-four
decisions from the past twenty years in which these statutes were either
invalidated or upheld.

144. Lee Epstein, Exploring the Participationof Organized Interests in State Court
Litigation, POL. RES. Q. 335, 346 (1994).
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The cases were then grouped according to the type of process used to
select high court justices in each state. Again using descriptions provided
by The Book of the States,'45 I characterized states as having one of four
types of judicial selection: merit selection, gubernatorial appointment, nonpartisan elections, and partisan elections. A case from a legislativeappointment jurisdiction is not included in this study.
The accompanying table depicts how cases were decided by various
state high courts. In some instances, states are represented twice because
their courts upheld one cap statute but invalidated another. Other states are
not represented because their courts of last resort never considered these
issues.
CROSS TABULATION OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND DECISIONS

IN DAMAGE CAP AND SCREENING PANEL CASES

Decision
Judicial Selection
--___Uphold Statute
Method
0
PartViiisan 'Electi on, 83%
Non-Partisan Election
67%
Gubernatorial Appt.
73%
,,Merit A ppoin

(N=34)

Invalidate Statute
0
17%
33%
27%

No courts whose members are selected through appointive or nonpartisan processes have invalidated the screening panel legislation.
Nationwide, courts are about evenly divided on whether damage caps violate
their state constitutions, but courts elected on partisan ballots have been
more likely to so hold than other types of courts.
The difference in dispositions between partisan-elected courts and the
three other types of courts is significant at the .01 level (x2=8.94, df=l)
which means that the probability of the difference resulting from chance is
1 percent.
What explains the difference? One previous empirical study of state
supreme court justices found that 80 percent of judges selected by partisan
elections are Democrats."4 This, along with the fact that the Democratic
Party is generally allied with the plaintiffs' bar, 47 may account for the

145.
146.

THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 10.
Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of FormalSelection Processes on the Characteris-

tics of Judges- Reconsidered, 6 L. & SOC'Y REv. 579 (1972).
147. See Dennis Conrad, Big CampaignDonorsLook ForBig Results FromLegislature,
CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Oct. 28, 1996, at 2.
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difference in tort reform constitutional rulings. It is also conceivable that
elected judges may feel they have more of a mandate to strike down
legislation because they, like legislators, are selected through a vigorous
democratic process. Finally, it is possible the plaintiffs' bar has been
successful in its efforts to elect sympathetic judges to the bench.
3. The organized bar and the Illinois Supreme Court

While many interest groups have at one time or another appeared
before the supreme court as a party or amicus curium to challenge the
constitutionality of legislation, one interest group in particular has done so
quite frequently - the organized bar. A Westlaw search found that since
1971, the Chicago Bar, Illinois State Bar, and Illinois Trial Lawyer
Associations, generally considered aligned with the Democratic Party, have
appeared before the Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court twenty-two times
to defend or try to overturn legislation.
In contrast, what might be called the Republican-aligned business
community"' has mounted far fewer such campaigns. A Westlaw search
for such cases, using "Illinois Manufacturers Association" or "Chamber of
Commerce" (either state or local) and "constitutionality" found only four
cases since 1971 in which the state's largest business trade associations
weighed in on the constitutionality of legislation. The Illinois State Medical
Society, another Republican-aligned group, apparently challenged the
constitutionality of only one piece of legislation since 1971. My Westlaw
search for the Democrat-aligned Chicago Teachers Union and Illinois
Education Association 49 also found only one such case. A caveat: a
search for challenges by associations may underestimate the number of
challenges by special interests, since large individual corporations have the
resources to maintain such litigation without coordinating with others.
It is difficult to say whether the legal community's highly active
constitutional litigation program is a reflection of its unique expertise in the
law, a particular receptiveness of Illinois courts to constitutional arguments
made by the legal community, or simply the vigor of the bar's overall
government relations program. According to State Board of Elections
disclosure records reviewed by the Associated Press, the legal community
is the top donor to legislative leaders' campaign funds, giving at least
$794,800 from July 1995 through June 1996." The Medical Society and
Illinois Hospital Association were ranked number two and three, giving
148. See Conrad, supra note 147.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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$248,320 and $133,000 respectively. Number four was the Manufacturers
Association, with $113,500; number five was the Chicago Teachers Union,
with $102,000."' It does appear that the bar's constitutional litigation
activity is disproportionately high relative to the other interest groups among
Illinois' top five political donors.
In some cases, bar associations' members have no pecuniary interest in
the outcome of a constitutional question, but the association appears solely
to provide a public interest point of view. In other cases, however, the
members clearly have a financial stake - primarily in matters of tort
reform.
The financial interests at stake in tort reform are substantial. The tort
system as it has evolved in the United States - with uncapped pain and
suffering awards by juries; contingency fees, which generally amount to one
third of a plaintiff's recovery; and the collateral source rule, which allows
recoveries for damages covered by insurance; has built-in rents that allow
significant redistribution of wealth from corporate defendants to lawyers.
The business community, sensing that the transfers are excessive, has
lobbied legislatures to reduce the transfers by changing the tort system's
rules.

5 2

a. The Bar and Judicial Campaign Funding
While business interests contribute a great deal of money in Illinois
legislative races, they have not been a significant factor in funding Illinois
Supreme Court campaigns. Instead, lawyers have been the most active
participants in judicial campaign finance.
Illinois' special interest groups tend to concentrate their campaign
giving among the state's four legislative leaders: the President and Minority
Leader of the Senate and the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House,
because the "leaders appoint committee chairs, control the flow of legislation, can influence the votes of rank-and-file lawmakers and funnel money
to the campaigns of lawmakers facing tough reelection battles." 15 The
accompanying table displays the top donors to legislative leaders' campaign
funds for the year ending June 30, 1996:

151. Id.
152. See GUSTAVE SCHUBERT, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM
(1986); PETER HUBER & ROBERT LITAN, EDS, THE LIABILITY MAZE (1991); PHILLIP J.
HERMAN, THE 96 BILLION DOLLAR GAME: You ARE LOSING (1993); Product Liability
Standards: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and
Competitiveness to Consider, H.R. 1910, 103d CONG. 2D SESS. (1994).
153. See Conrad, supra note 147.
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1. Various lawyer PACs and contributions of $1,000 or
more from attorneys: $794,800.
2. Illinois State Medical Society: $248,320.
3. Illinois Hospital Association: $133,000.
4. Illinois Manufacturers Association: $113,500.
5. Chicago Teachers Union: $102,000.
6. Philip Morris: $97,000.
7. Illinois Bankers Association: $88,250.
8. Ameritech: $72,100.
9. Richard Duchossois, Arlington International Racecourse: $70,545.
10. Empress Casino: $63,850."5
A study of supreme court justices' campaign finance disclosures by the
Chicago Sun-Times found that two members of the present court, Justice
Bilandic and Justice Heiple, raised no donations from lawyers and funded
their campaigns mostly with their own money.'55 But the other five
justices raised between 29 and 47 percent of their campaign budgets from
attorneys. 5 6 As Justice McMorrow told the Sun-Times, "It's perfectly
natural that lawyers be the biggest group of contributors. They have contact
with the court .... The lawyers are also the ones who would be familiar
with the candidate's background and who should be sitting on the
court.'

15 7

The Sun-Times reported that 30 percent of the donations Justice
McMorrow received for her 1992 race came from lawyers. D-2 forms on
file with the Illinois State Board of Elections report individual contributions
of $150.00 or more to candidates.15 McMorrow's report for the period
including the primary election showed about $60,000 in such contributions.159 Of those ninety-four contributors, eleven were members of the

154. Id.
155. Tim Novak & Jon Schmid, Lawyers' Donations Help Build Top Court, CHI. SUNTIMEs, Apr. 14, 1996, at 18.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. All contributions noted infra were taken from the candidates' individual D-2 forms
on file with the Illinois State Board of Elections.
159. The figures referred to in the remainder of this section come from disclosure
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Association of Trial Lawyers of America, giving $5,975.'" (The ATLA
affiliation is of interest because it identifies lawyers who primarily represent
plaintiffs. Many other lawyers are likely to donate because they are
personally acquainted with the candidate or frequently handle appeals, but
have no financial interests at stake in tort reform matters.) About $38,000
came from House Speaker Michael Madigan, whose funds, in turn, come
mostly from trial lawyers.' 6 ' Eight contributions, totaling $7,900, came
from corporations, including one from a corporate PAC. All others were
from individuals or law firms that do not represent plaintiffs in personal
injury cases.
Justice McMorrow's principal primary opponent, Michael Howlett Jr.,
received $205,400 in individual contributions over $150 during the same
reporting period. Of 199 such contributors, fourteen contributors could be
identified as plaintiffs' lawyers, giving $14,500. Only nine contributions,
totaling $13,250, were from business organizations; none were from business
PACs. The lion's share of lawyer contributors to Howlett's campaign were
large corporate law firms and Howlett's law partners. 62
The plaintiffs' bar played a much more significant role in the 1990
supreme court race between Justice Heiple and his Democratic opponent,
Toby Barry. Of $266,310 in itemized contributions received by Barry
between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1990, $44,150, or 17 percent of the
total, came from members of ATLA. Another $43,310, or 16 percent of the
total, came from the plaintiffs' bar's traditional ally, labor unions. Most of
the ATLA contributors lived outside Barry's judicial district. It appears
from his spending reports that Barry hired a Chicago political fundraising
consultant and held fundraising parties in Chicago that were attended
primarily by Chicago plaintiffs' lawyers. After Barry lost the election, his
reports for the period of January 1, 1991 to June 30, 1991 show, Barry
raised another $8,100. All but three of his twenty-two post-defeat
contributors were ATLA members, giving a total of $7,100.
Only $950 of Barry's contributions came from businesses and $400
came from doctors. The largest share of Barry's funding, $123,100, or 46
percent, came from the state Democratic Party and the Democratic state

reports on file with the Illinois State Board of Elections, pursuant to the Campaign Financing
Act.
160. Names were cross checked using ATLA's 1992-93 DESK REFERENCE, which lists
ATLA members in each state and city.
161. William Grady, TV Ads Escalate Cost Of High Court Race, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12,
1992, § 2 at 1.
162. Names were cross checked using SULLIVAN'S LAW DIRECTORY, which lists Illinois
lawyers and law firms.
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legislative leaders. Much of that money, in turn, likely came from the
plaintiffs' bar.
Heiple funded his campaign mostly with his own money (some
$365,000), but did accept about $60,000 from Republican Party committees
and a $425 contribution from the Illinois State Medical Society's PAC.
In a sense, the seven supreme court justices are analogous to the four
legislative leaders: like the four leaders, four justices control the law made
by one of the state's three branches of government. It is perhaps surprising,
then, that the state's top business, labor, and medical groups have not
participated in judicial campaigns to the extent that they participate in
legislative campaigns. While the largest medical interests contribute to
legislative leaders in roughly a 1:2 proportion to lawyers, 63 they made no
contributions at all in the McMorrow/Howlett race and just $425 in the
Heiple/Barry race. Manufacturers and tobacco interests, who contribute to
legislative leaders in at least a 1:4 proportion to lawyers,"6 and who, like
medical interests, have much to lose if tort reform laws are overturned, also
made no contributions.
Labor's only involvement was in the Barry campaign. While Justice
Heiple apparently was not soliciting contributions to his campaign, business
interests could have selected Michael Howlett as an appropriate beneficiary
of their largesse since he was running independent of the Democratic
organization and practiced law with a defense-oriented law firm. However,
they apparently did not.
Why is the proportion of business contributions to plaintiff lawyer
contributions in the judicial races significantly lower than it is in the
legislative races? It is probably explained by two facts:
First, the business community's government relations program must
focus on all three branches of government, two of which, the legislative and
the executive regulatory agencies, have much more direct and first-order
effects on their affairs than does the judiciary.
Second, for the trial bar, only one public policy issue matters, and the
judiciary has immediate effects on it. Moreover, lawyers are more familiar
with how the judiciary works, and are more likely to be personally
acquainted with the candidates.
One is tempted to say, then, that the bar has a "lock" on electing a
majority of its candidates to the supreme court. However, the experience of
other states tends to show that this is not the case. In Alabama and Texas,
163. Conrad, supra note 147. The amount given by medical interests may be higher
since the Associated Press study did not tabulate contributions by individual physicians or
health care executives as it did those by individual lawyers.
164. Id.
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two states where the plaintiffs' bar had enormous influence over judicial
elections through massive campaign funding, the business community has
gotten involved in races and succeeded in electing pro-defense justices.' 65
A similar effort may be in store for Ohio."6 But the business community's involvement in those states may have been facilitated by the unusual
judicial selection method in those states: justices must run for reelection in
head-to-head partisan contests. This enables interest groups to target
individual justices for defeat and pour resources into the campaigns of their
challengers. In Illinois, justices run only for retention every ten years, and
tradition prevents targeting judges for defeat unless they have proven to be
incompetent, intemperate or corrupt. 67 Business interest groups have little
advance warning of an impending vacancy and would have little time to
coordinate the recruitment or backing of candidates.
b. The Bar and ConstitutionalChallenges to State Law
In each instance where the business community has been successful in
persuading the Illinois General Assembly to enact tort reform, the Illinois
Trial Lawyers Association has asked the Illinois Supreme Court to invalidate
the legislation, and has in most cases succeeded.'6 The following is a
review and analysis of the cases.
Grace v. Howlett"6
The plaintiffs bar challenged the constitutionality of Illinois' no-fault
auto insurance law. The supreme court found that the statute's damage
limitation violated the state constitution's ban on special legislation. The
court also cited provisions of the state constitution which protect the right
to a jury trial and forbid judicial fee officers, in holding that the no-fault
law's mandatory arbitration scheme was invalid. Two Republican justices,

165. See Edward Felsenthal, A Year After Election, Alabama's ChiefJudge And His Foe
Battle On, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995; Ken Herman, Donors Reflect Court's PoliticalShift,
AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 20, 1996, at B1.
166. American Tort Reform Association, 1996 Election Report, Nov. 16, 1996.
167. Brendan M. Stephens, Campaign Season Begins For County Judges Who Face
Retention, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 9, 1996, at 1.
168. At the time of writing, ITLA was preparing to challenge Illinois' 1995 tort reform
legislation in the Illinois Supreme Court. See Mike Austin, JTLA Girds For Coming "Tort
Reform" Fight, Makes MandatoryAssessment On Members, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 16,
1996, at 1.
169. 283 N.E.2d 474 (I11. 1972).
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Underwood and Davis, dissented, arguing that the law had a rational
basis. 7 °
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n

17 1

The General Assembly enacted a medical malpractice reform statute
requiring that such cases be heard first by a screening panel, consisting of
a judge, a lawyer, and a doctor. The supreme court threw out the screening
panels, citing the principle that "the exclusive and entire judicial power" is
vested in the courts. 1 72 The screening panel violated the state constitution
because it "empowers the nonjudicial members of the medical review panel
to exercise a judicial function."'' 73 The court added, almost as an afterthought, that the panel statute also violated the right to trial by jury. 74
One law review commentator called the opinion "conclusory and confus175
ing."'
Perhaps the justices agreed, because the Wright decision was promptly
forgotten when the court later adopted through its own rulemaking processes
a mandatory arbitration program which also used three-member, non-judicial
panels to screen cases. 176 The court also subsequently adopted Supreme
Court Rule 100 in 1992, which provides for non-judicial administrative
hearing officers in child support cases, to do essentially the same things the
court said couldn't be done in 1976. It is possible that the court found some
subtle distinctions, or had a genuine change of heart, but it would seem that
an aversion to tort reform, rather than adherence to the state constitution,
might have motivated the earlier rulings.
The court in Wright also held that the provision of the statute capping
damage awards was unconstitutional under the state constitution's ban on
special legislation, finding the cap was "arbitrary.' 77 Two Republican
78
justices, Underwood and Ryan, dissented.
Mega v. Holy Cross Hosp.17 9 involved a challenge to a four-year
statute of repose in medical malpractice claims. The court upheld the law
170. Id. at 481.
171. 347 N.E.2d 736 (I11.
1976).

172. Id. at 739.
173. Id.at 739-40.
174. Id.at 741.

175. Jane Arancibia, Statutory Caps on Damage Awards in MedicalMalpractice Cases,
13 OKLA.CITY U. L. REV. 135, 151 (1988).
176. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., S.Ct. Rule 87 (West 1993).
177. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743.

178. Id. at 745-46.

179. 490 N.E.2d 665 (Ill. 1986).
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on a 4-1 vote, with Democratic Justice Goldenhersh joining the three
Republicans." 0 Justice Clark dissented; two other Democrats did not
participate. 8'
Bernier v. Burris 82 again involved a medical malpractice statute.
Three Democrat and two Republican justices ruled that a slightly modified
screening panel provision was unconstitutional. Republican Justice Ryan
dissented and one Democrat, Justice Simon, did not participate.'83 The
court unanimously upheld provisions disallowing punitive damages and
abrogating the collateral source rule, suggesting a moderate court in contrast
to the Alabama and Ohio supreme courts, which rejected those proviThis relative moderation might be another reason why Illinois
sions.'
supreme court elections, unlike those in Alabama and Ohio, have not been
followed by business interests.
Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. and Med. Ctr..'85 brought the court's split over
tort reform out into the open. The circumstances were odd: the defendants
in this police brutality case were seeking contribution from a third party
defendant, a doctor, alleging the plaintiff's damages were attributable to
medical malpractice. The defendants argued that the four-year statute of
repose upheld in Mega should not apply to a contribution action. The
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, perhaps seeing an opportunity for an
overruling of Mega with a change of personnel on the court, argued as
Justice
amicus that the statute of repose be held unconstitutional.
Goldenhersh's replacement, Justice Calvo, did indeed vote to invalidate the
law; but another new Democratic member, Justice Stamos, voted with the
Republicans to follow the Mega precedent.
What made the decision interesting was that Justice Calvo, in his
dissent, accused the majority of "abdicating its role as protector of those
unknowingly injured by medical malpractice,"' 8'6 echoing the rhetoric of
the Trial Lawyers Association.
By 1992, DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. 87 and its companion case
McAlister v. Schick 88 found the justices split entirely along party lines.
Justice Cunningham, now, apparently, a Republican, voted with three other
180. Id. at 667.
181. Id. at 671.
182. 497 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. 1986).
183. Id. at 779.
184. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Morris v. Savoy,
576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
1990).
185. 557 N.E.2d 873 (Ill.
186. Id. at 473.
1992).
187. 588 N.E.2d 1139 (I11.
188. 588 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. 1992).
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Republican justices to uphold a provision of the medical liability reform law

that required a physician's certificate of merit be attached to a complaint.

An interesting sidebar to the tort reform challenges is the court's

response to two suggestions from the defense side that Illinois tort law

9
the court split
might violate defendants' rights. In Clarkson v. Wright""
along partisan lines to hold that evidence of a plaintiffs failure to wear a
seat belt could not be admitted to reduce a damage award, contrary to the
general rule that violation of a traffic law is evidence of negligence.
Dissenting Justice Ryan suggested that such a disparity might be unconstitutional."9 In Harris v. Manor Healthcare 191 the court, without recorded
dissent, rejected an argument that a statute allowing treble damages for
violation of the Nursing Home Care Reform Act, on top of common law
punitive damages, would unconstitutionally subject defendants to paying
double recoveries."

ROLL CALL VOTES IN TORT REFORM CASES
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Id. at 270-73.
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Two cases interpreting the Illinois Constitution's home rule article also suggest that
treats constitutional challenges differently when-bar associations are involved. In
Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 432 N.E.2d 227 (111. 1982), the court
essentially overruled an earlier decision, Paper Supply, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 317 N.E.2d
3 (111.1974), and invalidated the City of Chicago's tax on services. Two of the plaintiffs
were the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association. In the first case, the
Democratic justices had, on a party line vote, upheld the city's "head tax" on employees.
Justice Ward switched from his earlier position to provide the key vote in the second case,
preventing the City from using its home rule power to tax attorney fees.
In Chicago Bar Association v. County of Cook, 467 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1984), political
maverick Patrick Quinn won a rare constitutional victory when the court, without written
dissent, threw out an ordinance aimed at curbing his influence as a commissioner of the Cook
County Board of Appeals. It was the only time the CRA aligned itself with Quinn, apparently
because its members did not want to see the tax board politicized. It was also a rare occasion
on which the Cook County justices apparently did not vote to support the Democratic
organization in a highly political case.
189.
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4. Analysis
The American Tort Reform Association has complained that courts'
treatment of tort reform might be affected by politics. In September 1994,
ATRA released a study entitled America's Third Political Party, which
analyzed campaign contributions by plaintiffs' lawyers in Alabama,
California, and Texas. (No similar study has been mounted of Illinois
judicial campaign funding.) The ATRA report noted that "since 1990 in
Alabama, sitting state supreme court justices and plaintiffs' lawyer-backed
candidates for the state supreme court have received in excess of $1.3
In Texas since 1990, sitting state
million from plaintiff's lawyers ....
candidates for the state
lawyer-backed
plaintiff's
supreme court justices and
supreme court have received in excess of $4 million from plaintiffs lawyers.
Few, if any, industries.., come close to contributing this amount of money
[in these contests].' 93
Given the active role that the bar plays in Illinois judicial elections and
litigation, and the bar's record of success in constitutional challenges, there
are, again, facts that could lead an observer to perceive that state courts are
"too political." Perhaps that is why in September 1996, when another in a
string of rulings by Cook County Circuit Court judges declaring parts of
Illinois' 1995 tort reform law unconstitutional was handed down, "Republican leaders maintained . . . that [Judge] Casciato's decision, as well as
some others that preceded it, were influenced by politics. They said it was
193. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, America's Third Political Party (1994),
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hardly coincidental that the legal onslaught against the law has been waged
principally in Cook County, where Democrats dominate the judiciary and
where trial lawyers have their most stable beachhead."',9 4 Mike Cys, a
spokesman for House Speaker Lee Daniels, commented, "The Cook County
judicial system has not been very friendly to the Republican legislature on
'
this or on a number of other issues."195
Compared with other state courts of last resort, Illinois' level of
plaintiffs' bar amicus activity seems to be average and a reflection of the
state's overall level of interest group strength. Researchers have found no
indication that amicus briefs have any effect in swaying courts' decisions.
There is nothing unusual about a state court using state constitutional provisions to invalidate tort reform laws. 97 However, the success
of the plaintiffs' bar in overturning tort reform laws may be related to the
system of partisan elections.
What might be more unusual about the tort reform cases is that, in
abandoning the "rational basis test," they appear to be the only consistent
line of decisions interpreting the bill of rights in the Illinois Constitution
differently than that of the United States Constitution. When criminal
defendants have argued that Illinois courts should interpret the state
constitution differently, they have usually encountered the "lockstep
doctrine," under which the state court follows the United States Supreme
Court's lead. 98 While civil libertarians on both the left'" and the
right" have called for rejecting the doctrine, deviations outside the sphere
201
of tort law have been few.

194.
1996, at
195.
196.

Andrew Fegelman, Another Tort Change Knocked Down, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18,
1.
Id.
Lee Epstein & C.K. Rowland, Debunking The Myth Of Interest Group Invincibility

In The Courts, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205 (1991).
197. Nationwide, by one count, state constititutional provisions have been used 75 times
to invalidate tort reform laws, while tort reform laws have been found to withstand state
constitutional scrutiny in another 120 instances. See VICTOR SCHWARTZ, MARK A. BEHRENS
& MARK D. TAYLOR, WHO SHOULD MAKE AMERICA'S TORT LAW: COURTS OR LEGISLATURES? (1997).

198. See People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336 (Il1. 1992).
199. See People ex rel Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873 (Ill.
1988) (Clark, J, concurring),

in which the court held that a law granting prosecutors a right to demand a jury violated the

state constitution.

200. See In re P.S., 679 N.E.2d 656 (11. 1997) (Heiple, C.J., dissenting), in which the
court turned down a state constitutional challenge to a forfeiture as violating double jeopardy.
201. See cases cited in Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 881 (Clark, J, concurring); see also People
v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1986) for a more typical view of interpreting the state

charter.
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The tort reform votes may be a reflection not of interest group
influence but of party influence. Philip Dubois noted that party identification can help to shape the political attitudes of judges. "[To the extent that
they attract individuals with personal histories of vigorous involvement in
partisan political activities, partisan judicial elections may actually accentuate the influence of partisan attitudes and values in the judicial
decisionmaking process." 2' Thus, as trial lawyers and anti-tort reform
views became more closely associated with the Democratic Party, Democratic judges may have felt more inclined to vote to invalidate tort reform laws,
and Republican judges more inclined to uphold them.
In sum, there appear to be some similarities between Illinois interest
group litigation and the legislative rentseeking model described by Magee:
In each process, special interest groups may contribute money to partyaligned candidates, issue endorsements, provide information to, and seek
favorable actions from officeholders. The primary distinctions are that in
the judicial milieu, information comes in the form of amicus briefs rather
than letters or lobbying visits; and that endorsements generally come in the
form of bar association recommendations as to "qualified" and "unqualified"
judicial candidates. This provides no proof that there is political influence
on the court, but certainly could fuel such a perception.
C. NON-ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT

Deciding politically-charged cases is not the supreme court's only
political function. The court has appointive and administrative powers that
in some instances have a distinctively political character.
Under the 1970 Constitution, a Legislative Redistricting Commission
is appointed when the General Assembly and Governor deadlock on
redistricting. 3 The court is charged with the responsibility of nominating
two individuals, not of the same political party, to act as a tie-breaking
member of the Redistricting Commission (one nominee's name is drawn by
lot to join the Commission).
This function need not be overtly political - the court could, if it
chooses, submit the names of two retired judges, academics, or other "blue
ribbon" candidates who adhere to different parties but are not primarily
recognizable as partisan politicians. For example, in 1971, a law professor
was appointed a special master to redistrict Connecticut's General Assembly
2
(Robert Bork, not then considered a conservative ideologue); ' in 1991,

202. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 146 (1980).
203. See RYAN, supra note 96.

204. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F.Supp 139 (D.Conn. 1972).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

the California Supreme Court appointed three retired judges to perform the
same task for that state's Legislature.2 5 Pursuant to Circuit Court General
Order 21, judge§ and election commissioners in Cook County maintain lists
of election law attorneys, who are sometimes active in political parties, but
who can be relied upon to serve as neutral arbitrators, for temporary
appointments as hearing officers in election matters. But the Illinois
Supreme Court, on both occasions it was called to act, nominated conspicuously partisan figures - in 1981, former Republican Governor Richard
Ogilvie and former Democratic Governor Samuel Shapiro, and in 1991,
Republican State Chairman Albert Jourdan and former Democratic State's
Attorney and Supreme Court Justice Daniel Ward. 2"
It could be argued that the state constitution, by specifically calling for
the court to nominate persons of different parties, requires a type of
"balanced partisanship" and that the court is simply following this mandate.
In 1991, the court's Democratic members' selection of retired Justice Ward,
a somewhat less partisan nominee than those in the past, coupled with a call
for abolition of the tie-breaking provision, seemed to recognize the
inappropriateness of the court's role in this area.
State law also empowers the court to fill vacancies in lower courts and
to assign judges to the Appellate Court. Again, this task need not be
political. The court could, if it desired, use its rulemaking power to adopt
merit selection for such appointments. On past occasions, the Democratic
Party of Cook County has slated the judges appointed by the supreme court
to the appellate and circuit courts for nomination to full terms, 2' raising
the question of whether the three Democratic justices elected from Cook
County, who by the court's informal tradition make appointments to
vacancies in their jurisdiction, coordinated their selections with party leaders.
A recent Chicago Sun-Times article questioned the supreme court's use
of assignment power to name eight, or one quarter, of the appellate court
judges in the First District.2" 8 The justices' expansive appointment powers
seem to conflict with Canon 3B(4) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct:
"A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise
his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and
favoritism."

205. Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Col. 1992).
206. See William Grady, Must Remaps Be Just A Matter Of Simple Luck?, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 19, 1992, § 4 at' 1.
207. See Thomas Hardy, Democrats Break Form In JudicialSlatemaking, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 19, 1987, § 3 at 3.
208. Tim Novak & Jon Schmid, Unelected Appellate Judges Linger On, CI. SUNTIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at 1.
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Recently, when the court tried to comply with the spirit of the rule in
filling some Cook County Circuit Court vacancies, the court's clumsiness
resulted in public criticism from a surprising source - one of the court's
own justices.
A large number of vacancies (due to deaths and retirements) had
occurred in judgeships assigned to judicial subcircuits - small districts
within Cook County - that were created to increase diversity on the county
bench. The supreme court filled the vacancies with temporary appointments,
and required the new judges to agree that they would not run for election
in any subcircuit.2 9 The justices evidently felt that their appointees
should not be conferred with the advantage of incumbency during the
coming elections.
While the justices' intention to steer clear of elective politics may have
been noble, it backfired. Twenty-nine appointed judges' terms expired
December 1, 1996, resulting in a large turnover of seasoned, experienced
judges in favor of new ones. The effect was particularly felt at Traffic
2 10 It was
Court, where new judges are usually given their first assignment.
necessary to suspend civil jury trials in the First Municipal District to cover
2
traffic courtrooms left vacant during a two-week transition period. '
212
Justice Freeman admitted, "We shot ourselves in the foot again.
The problem was exacerbated by the fact that up to thirteen of the
thirty-eight incoming subcircuit judges were deemed "not qualified" by bar
association screening committees.2" 3 The irony of the justices' election
restriction is that three quarters of all Cook County circuit judges began
their judicial careers as appointees," 4 making concerns for the integrity of
the electoral process a bit misplaced.
Some of the court's administrative powers place it in the role of
making something close to substantive law. The court has the power to set
bail amounts for traffic offenses which, in practice, become the amounts
levied as fines for minor violations. When the court raised the $50 bail for
209. David Bailey, 29 Appointed Judges Face Exit From Bench, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Nov. 21, 1996, at 1.
210. Id.
211. David Bailey, Civil Jury Trials Suspended In City Courts, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Nov. 26, 1996, at 1.
212. David Bailey, Election Limits On Appointed Judges Dropped, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Nov. 22, 1996, at 1.
213. Brian Cummings, Voters OK 6 Subcircuit Candidates Who Skipped Or Fared
Poorly In Bar Ratings, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 20, 1996, at 1; Chicago Bar Association,
Vote Smart Green Guide (1996).
214. M.A. Stapleton, The Knowledge That Makes A Judge, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov.
26, 1996, t 1.
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minor traffic offenses to $75 in 1993, Justice Heiple dissented, likening the
move to a "tax increase" imposed "without public notice, input, or participation.""' Since fines are generally prescribed by the legislature, the court's
assertion of authority in this area is decidedly unjudicial. But another court
function may be even closer to the making of substantive law - its role in
setting the passing score for the Illinois bar examination.
Illinois law students and their deans were surprised to read in a legal
trade paper in December 1996 that the bar exam passing rate had declined
for the second year in a row.21 6 Soon afterward, the president of the
Supreme Court's Board of Admissions to the Bar disclosed that the court
had decided, in 1995, to "adjust the passing score. 2 17 While sound policy
arguments could be made for restricting entry to the legal profession, the
court had made its decision without seeking comment from the public or
making any announcement. Certainly, if the Department of Professional
Regulation in the state's executive branch had sought to limit entry to any
of the other trades and professions the state oversees, notice would have
been given, hearings would have been held, and a decision would have been
reviewed by the legislature.
The highly political nature of the court's secret decision is highlighted
by the effect it had on the Northern Illinois University College of Law. Of
Illinois law schools, NIU was affected most seriously, with its graduates'
pass rate declining to 76 percent. Shortly before the court was internally
considering the fate of NIU's law students, the state's Board of Higher
Education and Board of Regents had engaged in a very public debate about
whether the law school should remain open. On October 6, 1992, the Board
of Higher Education's staff had formally recommended to the Board that the
law school be closed, noting the "poor job prospects for attorneys."218
After negotiations with the Board of Regents that then governed the school,
the recommendation was dropped.219 Two "political" bodies of state
government - the gubernatorially-appointed college boards - made a
decision to keep the school open without knowledge of the supreme court's
215. Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 526 (Heiple, J.,
dissenting) 155 Ill.2d clxxxi.
216. M.A. Stapleton, For Second Year, Fewer Would-Be Lawyers Clear Bar Exam
Hurdle, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 5, 1996, at 1.
217. Chris Klein, Ill. Deans' Dilemma - Is Bar Exam (A) Sentry or (B) Aptitude Test?,
NAT'L L. J., Dec. 30, 1996, at 1.
218. STATE OF ILLINOIs BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, "Staff Recommendations on
Productivity Improvements at Public Universities," Board Meeting Agenda Book Item #4,
Oct. 6, 1992.
219. Frank James, Crusader Sets Stage For Showdown On College Overhaul, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 2, 1994, at 3.
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plans to effectively deny many NIU students the chance to practice law.
The supreme court's adjustment of the pass rate may, in the end, force the
governing boards to reverse a decision made after careful consideration of
many interests - including those of the students who committed time and
money to a legal education, oblivious to the court's hidden agenda.
IV. EXPLAINING JUDGES' BEHAVIOR IN POLITICAL MATIERS
This article has surveyed areas of the Illinois Supreme Court's
decisionmaking that might lead an observer to suggest, as did those quoted
anonymously in the Sun-Times and NationalLaw Journal articles referenced
earlier, that the justices are "political." There appears to be evidence of
heightened party-line voting in partisan political matters. There is some
external political and interest group activity surrounding the court's rulings
on tort policy matters. The court reserves the right to guide policy in some
matters that are arguably political. But do the justices let political
considerations guide their decisionmaking, and if so, why?
Dubois argued that "the strength of the direct effect of a partisan
judicial constituency" will decline when "the party exercises less-effective
control over the future of the sitting judge."2 " Judges on the Illinois
Supreme Court do not face head-to-head re-election battles like legislators
or judges in states such as Ohio or Texas. The only checks that voters,
party leaders, or interest groups have on them are decennial retention
referenda and the possibility of adverse legislation (e.g. redistricting,
appropriations, constitutional revision). No supreme court justice has failed
retention under the 1970 Constitution; few of the hundreds of lower court
judges in Illinois are recalled either, and when they are, it is usually in
response to allegations of corruption. 22 ' The court's role as final authority
on the constitution protects it from most imaginable legislative retaliations.
Why then, would justices feel bound to vote in favor of political
interests which hold no effective check on their behavior? A judge may be
motivated by any number of goals. Synthesizing research in the area of
judicial politics, Lawrence Baum produced this partial typology of judicial
goals:
I. Content of Decisions
Making public policy consistent with the judge's policy
preferences

220. DUBOIS, supra note 69, at 148-49.
221. See Stephens, supra note 167.
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Achieving accuracy, clarity, and consistency in interpretation of the law
II. Life on the Court
Harmony with other judges and other participants in the
courts
Holding power within the court
Limiting workload
Maximizing judicial salaries and court resources
III. Career
Maintaining the current judicial position
Promotion to a higher court
Attaining attractive non-judicial positions
IV. Personal Standing
Popularity and respect in the legal community
Popularity and respect in the community as a whole
Self-esteem 222
Under the idealized model of judicial decisionmaking, only the
achievement of accurate and appropriate interpretation of the law would
motivate a judge; under the Magee model, career goals would be the
predominant motivations. But in Illinois, a middle-ground model prevails.
As noted earlier, re-election considerations are not a factor in checking an
Illinois Supreme Court justice's behavior. Nor would promotion to a higher
court be expected to be an influence, since no Illinois justice has been
nominated to a seat on the Federal Court of Appeals or Supreme Court in
recent memory, and there are considerable constraints upon a President's
making such nominations as rewards for political service.223
But the goals of maintaining harmony with other actors in the legal
system, and considerations of personal standing, could explain judges'
political behavior. Illinois' individualistic political culture inculcates values
of loyalty to political sponsors. "One fits his or her ideas to those of
organization leaders rather than the other way around. Compromise is
commonplace and virtuous. People who resign on principle are bullheaded;

222. Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges' Goals and JudicialBehavior, 47 POL.

REs. Q. 749, 752 (1994).

223. See, e.g., Ron Fournier, Clinton Appeals Court Nominee Quits; Was On Dole's
"Shame List", CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 9, 1996, at 1.
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they are called 'quitters' and 'losers'," according to one account of the
prevailing political mores.224
This would be particularly true for judges with a background in the
Cook County Democratic Organization. "A primary requisite for any
candidate wanting to run for office in the Democratic Party in Cook County
is loyalty to the party. A candidate must be willing to subordinate his
interests to the greater interests of the ticket and of the party as a whole,"
wrote political scientist Milton Rakove in his definitive treatise on the
Chicago Democratic machine.22 5 Rakove went on to cite various instances
of party leaders exacting retribution for disloyalty upon Chicago politicians, 21 6 two of whom went on to be elected as 'independent' candidates
for the Illinois Supreme Court and who could well have remembered their
ostracisms in rendering subsequent rulings.227 When candidates for judge
appear before Democratic Party slatemakers in Cook County, they usually
tell the committeemen that they have been loyal Democrats, often stressing
their, or their family's, history of Democratic affiliation.228
In his study of Chicago politics thirty-seven years ago, Edward C.
Banfield noted that political influence need not take the form of persuasion
nor of coercion or inducements; it can also be based "upon a sense of
obligation ('authority,' 'respect') [or] the wish of the influencee to gratify
the influencer ('friendship,' 'benevolence'). '229 Of the Illinois judiciary,
Banfield wrote:
In civil cases especially, political heads rarely attempt to
exercise influence. When the issue is public and essentially political . . . judges frequently take cues from the

224. VAN DER SLIK & REDFIELD, supra note 13, at 20.
225. RAKOVE, supra note 16, at 97.

226. Id. at 100-101.
227. Id. According to Rakove, Seymour Simon was dumped by party slatemakers in

1966 but was eventually elevated to the Appellate Court as part of an accomodation with
Mayor Daley. He defeated the party's candidate to be elected to the Supreme Court in 1980,
and went on to provide the deciding vote against Democratic gubernatorial nominee Adlai
Stevenson's recount petition in 1982. In re Contest of Election for Governor, 444 N.E.2d

1983).
170 (I11.
William Clark ran afoul of Mayor Daley in 1968 but came back to win election
to the supreme court as an independent Democrat in 1976. He apparently learned a different
lesson from his exile in the political wilderness than did Simon, and became a dependable

vote in favor of the Democratic Party and the Trial Lawyers Association. RAKOVE, supra
note 13, at 97.
228. John Fynn Rooney, Democratic Slatemakers Start Making Their Lists, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Nov. 25, 1991, at 1.
229. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLMCAL INFLUENCE 4 (1961).
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appropriate political heads. They may do so because the
political head can give or withhold some advantage (like
all who run for office, judges must be "slated"; but
because they have long terms and the party is not likely
to "dump" a judge who is endorsed by the Bar Association, they are relatively independent); more often, however, a judge accepts cues from the political head out of
friendship or respect (the judge and political head are
likely to have gone to school and to have risen in politics
together) or because he feels that it is right and proper to
give the views of the chief executive special weight. As
a rule, the political head and the judge are not in direct
communication... The judge gets his cues by reading
the newspapers and by discussing public affairs as other
people do with friends and associates ....
The one sure way to remove an issue entirely from the
influence of the political heads is to take it to the United States
Supreme Court.23
In the world of the partisanly-elected justice, personal standing may
come not from respect by white-shoe attorneys or law professors, but from
respect by the party's leaders and key supporters. The justice could feel
secure in knowing that he is viewed as loyal and virtuous by those who
aided his ascent, and that leaders of the major bar associations will defend
him from public attacks.
This theory would not only explain the phenomenon of party-line
voting but also the apparent tendencies of justices to vote for the "political
establishment" over mavericks, and to vote for the interest groups identified
with the justices' parties.
A recent study of judicial campaign finance in Illinois found that "most
contributors gave to candidates who were running in elections they could not
conceivably lose."23' The authors concluded: "The fact that the bulk of
funds are raised by sure winners and sure losers who are sitting judges
makes it fair to assume that some contributors believe they are getting
something for their money, even if it is something less than the most blatant
judicial partiality. 232

230. Id. at 239.
231. Marlene Nicholson & Norman Nicholson, Funding JudicialCampaignsIn Illinois,
77 JUDICATURE 294, 297 (1994).
232. Id. at 299.
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That study suggests that judicial campaign donors, aware of the
prevailing mores in Illinois politics, may attempt to play upon judges' need
for acceptance from political backers by building a relationship that, under
those mores, calls for loyalty and faithful future service. This might explain
why some judges have shown strong sympathy for the positions of the Trial
Lawyers Association.2 33
Meanwhile, the lack of any real negative consequences from partisan
decisionmaking can relieve justices from pressure to refrain from it. Dubois
noted that "political, cultural, and professional norms transmitted through
various attentive nonparty publics of the court (bar groups, civic organizations, and the press) may impel judges to temper their partisan orientations.
Socialization experiences on the bench ... vary from state to state ....In
those states where judicial norms emphasize that judges should assume but
a limited policy-making role and that they closely adhere to precedent where
possible, party orientations undoubtedly assume a diminished importance. ' '2M
In Illinois, there has been little attention to or criticism of party-line
voting in political cases. As the news articles quoted earlier make clear, the
court has heretofore received little public scrutiny, and the court's only
critics have been anonymous. A court which has apparently divided into
party caucuses to make Redistricting Commission nominations could not be
expected to have strong internal taboos against party-line voting.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The combination of heightened media attention to the Illinois Supreme
Court and the takeover of the General Assembly by Republican legislators
resulted, in 1996, in renewed discussion of changing judicial selection
procedures.
The ChicagoSun-Times published an article pointing out that the state's
Judicial Districts had not been redrawn after the 1980 or 1990 censuses, and
that the districts now contained considerable population disparities.235
According to 1990 census figures reported by the Sun-Times, the First
District's population was 5.1 million; the Second District's, 2.37 million; the
Third District's, 1.45 million; the Fourth District's, 1.24 million; and the
Fifth District's 1.28 million.

233.
234.
235.
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The article attracted attention from Republican lawmakers, who
evidently perceived that a bill to even the disparities between the districts
might bolster Republican strength on the court.236 Republican legislators
considered advancing constitutional amendments that would end Cook
County's entitlement to three justices,237 or split the county into three
districts,23 either of which would increase the likelihood of electing
another Republican justice from Chicago's suburbs.239
Republican leaders also showed interest in merit selection of supreme
court justices and other judges. Resolutions were proposed which would
create a second state supreme court to handle exclusively civil matters, with
seven justices appointed by the governor from candidates selected by
nominating commissions; ° and to give the governor power to appoint all
supreme court justices.24 However, submission of constitutional amendments to the electorate requires a three-fifths vote of the General Assembly,
which Senate Democrats were able to block. 22
Leaders of the Chicago Bar Association and Illinois State Bar
Association also weighed in against the resolutions.243 ISBA president
Terence K. Hegarty was quoted as saying that the association opposed
gubernatorial appointment of the supreme court - seemingly a reversal of
its earlier stands.2' Bar opposition may have been motivated by the
perception that the Republicans intended to take away the Democrats'
control of the court,245 endangering the bar's own interests.
In the end, on their last day of control of both houses, Republican
legislators passed, and Governor Jim Edgar signed, a bill dividing Cook
County into three subdistricts, each electing one justice. One of the districts
consisted primarily of suburban Republican strongholds, giving Republicans

236. Mark Samuels, GOP Targets Veto Session For CourtRedistricting, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 22, 1996, at 1.
237. David Heckelman, Redistricting Of The Supreme Court Is Apparently Dead For
This Legislative Session, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 15, 1996, at 1.
238. Mark D. Samuels, GOP-Backed Merit Selection Plans Dead: Demes, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1.
239. Id.
240. Brian Cummings, Bar Leader Derides Call For 2nd State Supreme Court, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 15, 1996, at 1.
241. Samuels, supra note 236, at 1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Robert W. Bergstrom, State Bar's Stance On JudicialMerit Selection Is Switch
From Past, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 1, 1996, at 2.
245. Brian Cummings, GOP Merit Selection Plans Voted Down By State Bar As Being
"Totally Political",CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 1, 1996, at 1.
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an excellent chance to pick up a supreme court seat. The bill also made
adjustments to the four downstate districts.
The 1996 legislative maneuvering demonstrated that Illinois political
and bar leaders intuitively sense the political dynamics discussed here that judicial selection plays an important role in outcomes in politically
important cases. As one Democratic lawmaker told the Sun-Times, "What
the Republicans wanted to be able to do was control the Supreme Court in
Illinois. If they do so, they have a great ability to control the new
[legislative reapportionment]246map we draw, which would put them in power.
That's what it's all about.
For the organized bar, the stakes are also high. A change in composition of the court could mean judicial approval of tort reform legislation,
significantly cutting many lawyers' incomes. It comes as no surprise, then,
that the bar associations have risen to defend the supreme court from
criticism and attempts at reform.247
One other aspect of the court's political role has received attention from
policymakers though not from the public or media. In the wake of Justice
Bilandic's dissent in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, which argued that the
tie-breaking provision of the 1970 Constitution's redistricting mechanism
was unconstitutional, Secretary of State George Ryan appointed a committee
to explore proposals to change the supreme court's role in resolving an
impasse. 248
The Illinois Constitution is not unique in calling on the state supreme
court to appoint a tie-breaking official when a legislative redistricting
commission deadlocks, but it is unique in providing for the court to
nominate commissioners from separate political parties, with a lottery to
determine the final member.249 While most commentators who have
criticized the provision have objected to the arbitrariness of having an
important matter settled by the luck of the draw, 2" an equally unsettling
aspect is the explicit requirement that the court name two people identified
with political parties. Presumably the court divides into partisan caucuses
to perform this function, with the justices perhaps even soliciting the advice

246. Dave McKinney, House May Weigh Judges' Qualifications,CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
25, 1996, at 1.
247. See, e.g., Stephen Anderson, Headline Writers Take Unkindest Cuts, ISBA BAR
NEWS, Mar. 15, 1996, at 1.
248. Letter from Craig A. Roberts, Assistant to the Secretary, to author, (July 5, 1996)
(on file with author).
249. ILLINOIS REDISTRICTING PROCESS REVIEW COMMISSION, Redistricting in Illinois,
Draft Report, Oct. 12, 1993.
250. Id.
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of party leaders in making their nominations. Members of Ryan's Illinois
Redistricting Process Review Commission submitted six reform proposals
for consideration; their only common characteristic was removing the
supreme court from the tie-breaking process.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this paper places some of the criticisms of the Illinois
Supreme Court into a context that enables the legal community, the
legislature, and the public to address potential reforms. In my view, the two
issues that need most to be addressed are those of accountability and
legitimacy of the court.
A. THE GAG RULE PARADOX

The United States Court of Appeals case, from which came the quote
that opened this paper, addressed the issue of whether candidates could be
disciplined for using traditional campaign rhetoric while running for the
Illinois Supreme Court. Judge Posner balanced the constitutional principles
of vigorous campaigns and impartial justice under law to reach a compromise decision serving both interests. But he was not required to answer the
more pressing question he raised: whether the two principles could truly be
reconciled. That, of course, is not a question for judges to answer but for
Illinois voters and their legislative representatives to determine.
In Buckley v. Valeo,2 51 the United States Supreme Court adopted a
free speech model of political campaigning. "Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
'
of the system of government established by our Constitution."2 52
The
speech clause was intended to allow voters access to maximum political
information to use electoral process to shape government to their preferences.
This model is not applied to judicial campaigning as strenuously as it
is to campaigns for legislative or executive office. Since judges are
supposed to decide disputes on the merits, rather than prejudge cases,
judicial candidates are not allowed to state opinions on how they would vote
on various issues.
Judges have used legal rules, codes of conduct, and secrecy covenants
to create the appearance of the independent, nonpartisan tribunal, but the
image does not necessarily reflect reality. Part III-C of this paper demonstrates how Illinois Supreme Court justices can be as political as other
251. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
252. Id. at 14.
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officials in the sense that they make important political appointments and
substantive policy decisions completely apart from their duties in deciding
cases. Yet voters receive less information about judicial candidates' views,
and do not get to see the workings of this branch of government. Instead,
the public gets the' worst of both worlds: a de facto political body, one
without many of the accountability mechanisms that go with traditional
political bodies.
A solution to this problem would be for the court to open up its
processes in making non-adjudicative decisions to greater public participation and scrutiny. Some type of merit selection procedure for appointment
of lower court judges would help reassure the public that judges are chosen
on the basis of qualifications rather than politics. Holding hearings on
issues of traffic ticket fines, bar admissions and similar matters would allow
the public to participate in decisions that may affect them in the future.
B. LEGITIMACY

In looking at partisan disputes and tort reform battles, this article has
pulled out a tiny set of the court's most controversial cases. The vast
majority of the court's work involves mundane interpretation of the state's
civil and criminal law,253 and as noted earlier, seldom involves splits along
party lines. One might ask, what is all the fuss about?
Furthermore, as Swanson and Melone argued, since judges will always
be guided by their values, and since party is a good indication of how those
values will be translated into votes, don't partisan elections and judicial
partisanship help voters identify candidates who share their values? 2"
But the fact that there is an appearance and a perception of judicial
partisanship may be eroding the legitimacy of the court as an institution. As
applied to the judiciary, legitimacy means that the public will accept a
court's decision as definitive, whether it agrees with the decision or not, and
will refrain from attacking the court for its actions. 255 The United States
Supreme Court is considered by scholars to have a great deal of legitimacy
because people respect it as an institution that is impartial and competent.256 While there is not total consensus on the empirical validity of the
concept of "legitimacy" as applied to the courts, there is a sense among
253. See, e.g., Ruth E. VanDemark, The Illinois Supreme Court's 1993 Season: The New
Team in the Civil Field, 82 ILL. B. J. 294 (1994); James Geis, A Survey of Recent Illinois
Supreme Court Crminal Opinions, 82 ILL. B. J. 316 (1994).
254. Swanson & Melone, supra note 71, at 329-30.
255. James L. Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal
Institutions, 39 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 459, 465 (1995).
256. Id.
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political scientists that the United States Supreme Court commands a great
deal of respect because it is viewed as insulated from politics; i.e., it rules
7
on the merits of disputes without regard to partisanship or favoritism.2'
As one author notes, "Whether or not the concept of the Supreme Court's
legitimacy has empirical validity, it is 'real' and important because so many
political actors believe in and seek to preserve the Court's image as a legal
institution."'5 8
So, while we are familiar with the frequent calls by politicians for
amendments to overrule controversial decisions, impeachment of liberal
justices, and once, in the 1930s, for "packing" the Court, we have seen few
instances in which the attempts have been successful or even been acted
upon. The Court's reserve of legitimacy and the respect it engenders in
Congress have prevented it.
On the other hand, in Illinois, just in the past three years, we have seen
the legislature act three times to directly challenge the state supreme court
and its justices.
First was Public Act 88-550, signed into law by Governor Edgar just
seventeen days after the court issued its ruling in the "Baby Richard"
59
case.

2

Second was the supreme court redistricting law passed in January 1997.
This legislation so unquestionably violated an earlier court ruling" ° that
literally nobody would step forward to defend its constitutionality. 261' The
measure created an administrative nightmare by dividing appellate court
jurisdiction within judicial circuits,2 62 leading one to wonder if the bill had
just been hastily drafted, or was a burst of spite never intended to be
implemented.

257. James L. Gibson, Understandingsof Justice: InstitutionalLegitimacy, Procedural
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259. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.
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654 (1994).
260. People ex rel Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections, 558 N.E.2d 89

(Ill. 1990).
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Third was the decision of the state House of Representatives in April
1997 to conduct an impeachment inquiry into the activities of Justice Heiple,
263
a probe that may have had its genesis in calls to talk-radio programs.
In each instance, the General Assembly acted in a manner that
questioned the authority of the courts in areas in which legislatures have
traditionally deferred to it. The Baby Richard law attempted to overrule a
The redistricting law directly
judicial decision in a pending case. 2'
contradicted the court's earlier interpretation of the state constitution. The
Heiple impeachment inquiry marked the legislature's first interest in
disciplining a judge in 150 years. 265 This was particularly remarkable
considering that Heiple was basically accused of being (and eventually
2
found to be) merely an "arrogant" and "imperious" jerk. ' During the
FBI's Greylord probe of judicial corruption, in which numerous judges were
caught 7taking bribes, the General Assembly had never bothered to assert
26
itself.
Were the legislature's actions in these three instances the result of
Justice Heiple's intemperate remarks in his supplemental Baby Richard
Or were they encouraged and facilitated by the general
decision? 2'
disdain of the Illinois Supreme Court reported in the Sun-Times and
National Law Journal articles? Surely it is easier to challenge a "political"
court than a "prestigious" court. These are questions the justices have to
ponder, if they wish to protect the prestige of their court, and that the bar
and public must ponder, if we value an independent judiciary.
C. REFORMING THE COURT

Is the Illinois Supreme Court too political? Probably yes. An appearance of favorable treatment toward political interests has seemingly
cheapened the court and may have invited the recent retaliations from the
legislature that only further demeaned the judiciary.
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Whose fault is this? The justices' fault? Does former Justice
Cunningham deserve reproach for switching his vote in the legislative remap
case for crass political reasons? Or are the dissenters in Ryan III guilty of
political sour grapes in making the allegation?
The state constitution's fault, for instituting an elective judiciary and
giving the supreme court too much administrative authority?
The fault of the state's parties, interest groups, and the public, for not
recruiting, supporting, and electing candidates with impeccable credentials?
Or the fault of the state's bar, for giving positive, rather than negative,
reinforcement to the court's partisan tendencies, by always defending and
never criticizing the court?
Certainly the legislature deserves blame for not seriously examining the
court. Rather than addressing important questions of judicial selection and
qualifications, it has put on political sideshows.
The court itself has awakened to the need to improve its image. But
superficial public relations efforts will not suffice.
It is time for a critical, non-partisan reassessment of the Illinois
Supreme Court. The terms of a majority of the court's justices will expire
close to the end of this decade, providing an excellent opportunity for a
fresh start. The legislature can bolster the court's stature by adopting
selection procedures that assure the public that the justices are highly
qualified and non-political. The court can boost its own stature by reducing
its own freedom to act in the political sphere. Interest groups can help by
setting aside thoughts of political advantage and seeking a level playing field
in which political cases are decided on their merits. By acting now, Illinois'
leaders could make the perception of a "political" supreme court disappear
with the twentieth century.

